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EL CAMINO MILITAR
. By F. T. CHEET.HAM

day of December, 1850, President Millard
O Fillmore13thissued
his proclamation declaring the settleN THE

ment of the boundary dispute between the State of Texas
and the United States, and that the organic act creating the
Territory of New Mexico passed by congress on September
9, 1850, was in full force and effect. This act extended the
constitution and laws of the United States to the newly
created territory and carried with it the duty of the general
government to protect the inhabitants against invasion by
all enemies both foreign and domestic. In fact it had been
the policy of the government to do this ever since the armed
forces of the United States had seized the territory in 1846.
General Kearny in his proclamation made at Santa Fe on
August 19, 1846, had proclaimed for the inhabitants protection against the incursions of hostile Indians.
,Relying on this assurance, adventurous settlers pushed
northward from Taos and Abiquiu and established settlements in the San LUIs valley, then a part of the territory.
Costilla was settled in 1848. In 1851 a colony settled on the
Culebra river near the present town of San LUIs, Colorado.
In the spring of 1854, Lafayette Head and about fifty families located on the north side of the Conejos river.
The Utes and several roaming bands of Apaches regarded these settlements as invasions of their hunting
grounds and began making war on the settlers. The government had, off and on since the Pueblo Rebellion of 1847, kept
1
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troops at Taos. Afterwards the war department erected a
fort on the Rio Grande del Rancho, about nine miles south
of Taos. In 1852, Fort Massachusetts was built on Ute
Creek about six miles north of the present town of Fort Garland, Colorado. However, during the winter of 1853 and
1854, this fort was unoccupied. On March 13, 1854, a war
party of Utes and Apaches attacked the settlers on the
Conejos. Under the leadership of Lafayette Head the Indians were beaten off. Securing reinforcements, the Indians,
about 250 strong, attacked Troops F and I of the First U. S.
Dragoons (afterwards known as the First U. S. Cavalry) on
a bridle path in the Embudo Mountains. The soldiers numbering sixty strong were commanded by Lieutenant Davidson. They suffered heavily, losing all but seventeen men and
only four escaped injuries.
General Garland, commanding the Department of New
Mexico, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Cooke to take the field
and chastise the marauders. What followed can best be
gleaned from his report:
Headquarters Department of New. Mexico
Albuquerque, April 1, 1854.
Colonel: I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of
the general-in"chief, a copy of a report from Major Blake, first dragoons, very unsatisfactory as regards particulars.
The Indians, Jicarilla Apaches and Utahs, have managed to combine a force of 250 warriors, and unexpectedly attacked a company of
dragoons, 60 strong, about 25 miles from Fernandes de Taos, under the
" command of Lieut. J. W. Davidson, first dragoons, and succeeded, after
, a desperate conflict, in overwhelming it. Lieut. Davidson and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, both wounded, returned from the battlefield
with about seventeen men, most of them wounded.
The troops displayed a gallantry seldom equalled in this or any
country, and the officer in command, Lieut. Davidson, has given evidence of soldiership in the highest degree creditable to him. To have
sustained a deadly contest of three hours, when he was so greatly outnumbered, and then to have retired with the fragment of a company,
crippled up, is amazing, and calls for the admiration of every true
soldier.
To prevent further disaster, I have ordered Lieut. Col. Cooke,
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second dragoons, to take the field, with about 200 dragoons and a
company of artillery armed with rifles.
If hostilities are continued-and I have little doubt such will be
the case-I will be forced to call upon the governor of this Territory
for two or three companies of volunteers.
It is very desirable that a strong mounted force, with a good supply of horses, be sent out early in the spring.

**

**

**

**

I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant,
JNO. GARLAND

Brevet Brigadier General Commanding
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adjt. General,Headquarters of the Army, New York.
Headquarters Department of New Mexico
Santa Fe, April 30, 1854.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for the information of ,the
major general commanding the army, that Lieut. Col. Cooke, second
dragoons, on hearing of the disaster which befell the command of Lieut.
Davidson on the 30th March, proceeded, with the available force at
Fort Union, in the shortest possible time to Taos, where he organized a:
force of 200 men, and on the instant marched in pursuit of the
Indians, whom he overtook on the 8th on the upper branches of the
Agua Calientes, and immediately gave them battle, the result of which
will be found in the enclosed copy of his report. This prompt and
energetic movement reflects the highest credit upon this officer, and I
feel satisfied has prevented the Utahs from making common cause
with the Jicarilla Apaches. It is known that the Indians lost six
warriors in the affair of the 8th. It has also been ascertained that they
have lost four of their chiefs since the commencement of hostilities,
and nearly the whole of their animals and ba"ggage. Their pursuit was
checked for a few days by a violent storm of wind and snow which
lasted thirty hours, and very nearly paralyzed the whole command.
The enemy had previously led their pursuers over the most rugged
ground which troops were ever known to compaign in-the spurs of
the mountain often reaching to the height of 3,000 feet, very abrupt,
and covered with snow several feet in depth.
Col. Cooke is now at a small Mexican village (Rito) west of the
Rio Grande, and though suffering with chills and 'fever, has sent out
two detachments of about 140 men each, in hot pursuit, and with strong
hopes of bringing the Indians to battle. Their numbers have been
reduced by desertions, wounds, and death, to about 100 warriors. That
is the greatest number now assembled at anyone point.

)
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It is all-important to crush this band of pirates. They have too
long indulged in murder and plunder to leave a hope of reformation.
They do not pretend to keep good faith in treaties or promises. Their
thorough chastisement will undoubtedly have its effect upon the contiguous tribes now looking on with deep interest for the result, and
will give us assurance of many months of peace.
I have made strong efforts to bring this business to a speedy close,
and will succeed if it is within the reach of possibility. Unusual and
extraordinary measures have been taken to effect this desirable object,
and which will be explained in another communication.
I have not as yet had a report of operations of the three companies
ordered to Sierra Blanco to divert the attention of the Mezcalero from
this quarter.
I am, Colonel, with great respect, your obedient _servant,
JOHN GARLAND

Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters of the Army, New York.
Headquarters Department of New Mexico.
Santa Fe, June 30, 1854.
COLONEL: In making report of the militant operations against
the Jicarilla Apaches under the eye and orders of Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke, 2nd dragoons, for the information of the general-in-chief, I
will confine myself to the simple remark that all has been done which
was in the power of troops to do.
I approve most cordially the manner in which Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke has conducted his campaign.
The Jicarilla Apaches have been most thoroughly humbled and
beg for peace. They are dispersed in small parties with the exception
of one band, which is now hard pressed by about one hundred men
under Major Blake and Captain Ewell, 1st dragoons.
In order to a full understanding of the vigorous prosecution of the
campaign, the difficulties encountered and overcome, I have thought
it advisable to transmit the detailed reports of Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke, marked A, of Brevet Major Carleton, 1st dragoons, marked B,
and of Lieutenant Ransom, 1st dragoons, marked C. These officers are
entitled to the highest commendation for the zeal, activity, and gallantry displayed by them in prosecuting the war; they have proven
that to the Indians which is worth more to us than a victory; that is,
they are not safe from pursuit in the most inaccessible parts of the
Rocky mountains.
For the activity and zeal displayed by the junior officers, and for
other interesting details, I respectfully call attention to the accom-
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panying reports already referred to. All speak in the highest terms of
praise of the Mexicans and Pueblos employed as trailers, spies, etc.
Captain Quinn, who had the immediate charge of them, gave evidence
throughout of sagacity and indomitable courage; the same remark will
equally apply to Mr. Kit Carson, sub-agent of Indian affairs.
I will simply add, in conclusion, that one hundred and eighty men
are now in the country of the Mezcalero Apaches, under the command
of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, 3rd infantry. This band of
Indians has been infesting the road leading from EI Paso to San
Antonio, committing murders and robberies; the steps which I have
taken will, it is believed, put an end to their depredations in that
quarter.
The Navajoes have remained quiet this year; a small party of
them, renegades, stole some hundreds of sheep last month, which the
nation has restored to the proper owners.
The Utahs are playing a doubtful game, and have to be watched
very closely; their sympathies are all with the Jicarilla band of
Apaches.
I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN GARLAND

Brevet Brigadier General Commanding Department.
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adj. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, New York. 1

These affairs with the Indians demonstrated the necessity of constructing military roads to reach the outposts of
the territory. Congress accordingly, by an act approved July
17, 1854, appropriated $20,000.00 to construct a military
road from Taos to Santa Fe; and for another from Santa Fe
to Dona Ana, including the sinking of wells, the sum of
$12,000.00.
The order of Jefferson Davis, secretary of war, concerning these appropriations, is of interest:
War Department
Washington, November 28, 1854.
SIR: By an act approved July 17, 1854, the following appropriations are made for the construction and repair of roads in the Territory
of New Mexico, viz: from'Taos to Santa Fe $20,000.00, and from Santa
Fe to Dona Ana, including the sinking 'of wells if required, $12,000.
You are hereby charged with the execution of these works.
1. From Executive Documents, 2nd Session, 33rd Congress, Volume 1, Part 2
(1854-1855), PP. 33-36.
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As indicated by the terms of the appropriation act, the want of
water is one of the difficulties to be overcome on the route last mentioned, and your attention will be first directed to that object. It is
believed that the readiest and cheapest mode of procuring water will be
by sinking artesian wells, and for that purpose the apparatus procured
to make examinations in connection with the exploration of railroad
route to the Pacific, will, when no longer required on that work, be
turned over to you at Santa Fe.
When, as in these cases, a comparatively small amount of money is
appropriated for a long line of road, the department has directed that
the road be first rendered practicable for wagons through its entIre
length, and that the remainder of the appropriation be expended on the
more difficult portions of it, so as to render the whole as uniform as
possible. You will pursue this plan in executing the work now intrusted
to you.
It is deemed best to have the work done by contract if practicable,
and in making contracts for the purpose, to endeavor to have them
taken by; persons residing near the line of the road, or otherwise personally interested in its completion, stipulating either for the execution
of a specified quantity of work, or, what perhaps is preferable, for the
completion of a certain portion of the road, payment being subject
to your approval of the work.
You will consult freely with the commanding officer of the department in regard to the location and construction of the roads.
The amount of the above-mentioned appropriations will be placed
at your credit with the assistant treasurer at St. Louis, Missouri.,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,.
JEFF'N 'DAVIS

Secretary of War.
Captain E. P. Scammon,
Corps Top. Engs., Santa Fe, New. Mexico. 2

Before the Taos-Santa Fe military road could be completed, a call for troops was again made. Troops B, D, and
F of the 1st Dragoons and Battery D, 2nd U. S. Artillery,
participated. Six companies of volunteers, four of which
took part in the Saguache campaign, were recruited by order
of the ,governor of the territory, who commissioned Capt.
Ceran St. Vrain as colonel commanqing. This expedition
left Taos in February, 1854, and followed the trace made by
the settl~rs from that place to Fort Massachusetts on Ute
2.

Ibid., Pp. 42-43.
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Creek at the foot of the Blanca Range. From Fort Massachusetts the forces crossed the San Luis Valley and on March
19 it encountered the Indians in the Cochotopa, not far from
the present town of Saguache. The Utes fled and were again
attacked in the Poncha Pass on the 21st and 23rd of March.
The troops then returned to Fort Massachusetts to replenish
their supply of munitions. Col. St. Vrain, with the volunteers, was sent over the Sangre de Cristo Pass to atttack
the Apaches, while the regulars went north. The latter had
two fights with the Utes, first on the headwaters of the
Arkansas on April 29, and in the Saevatch valley on May 1
and 2. Col. St. Vrain encountered the Apaches on the Purgatoire river and gave them a good beating. The regulars suffered a terrific loss of horses in this campaign, for they could
not secure forage and the horses died of starvation. The
volunteers mounted on native horses. They grazed on
sweet bark cottonwoods and pawed up the snow to eat the
grass underneath.
The. route of the first road built by the army was
approximately Santa Fe to Velarde (then called La Joya),
thence through the hills to Dixon (Embudo Plaza), thence
to Penasco via Ojo Sarco, and over the pass between the
Rio Pueblo and the Rio Grande del Rancho to Fort Burgwin,
or Cantonment Burgwin, as it was officially called, and from
the fort to Taos. The pass just mentioned is known to this
day as the "D. S." Hill, because the road was built by the
army.
In 1858, Capt. J. N. Macomb of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, made surveys of three proposed routes
for the road from Taos to Santa Fe. His findings are set
forth in his report to Col. J. J. Abert, chief of Topographical Engineers, D. S. A., on September 29, 1858, as
follows:
IV. ROAD FROM TAOS TO SANTA FE
This road is one of very great interest and importance, whether
considered in a commercial or military light, as the means of affording
an easy outlet for the abundant products of the rich and justly cele-
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brated valley of Taos, or as the route of communications between the
headquarters of the department and the upper posts of the valley of
the Rio del Norte.
The chief obstacle to the easy construction of a road between Taos
and Santa Fe is the mountainous formation which extends westwardly
from the great southern branch of the Rocky mountain range, in the
vicinity of the Moro Peaks, and crosses the Rio del Norte, constituting
a formidable natural barrier between the valley of Taos and the country around Santa Fe. At present wagons pass with great difficulty
over the route by the eastern part of this barrier; but the road is
very circuitous and rough, crossing mountain streams and immense
stony hills and being in many places annually encroached upon by deep
arroyos. To improve this route, and make the grade easy enough for
loaded wagons, would considerably increase its present length; and the
great expense which it would cause could produce no lasting benefit,
owing to the exposure of the work to destruction from the mountain
torrents in the rainy season.
Between the above route and the Rio del Norte there is a bridle
path which passes in a direct course through EI Embudo, but it is so
steep that in wet weather animals pass over it with difficulty. The
heavy grade and mobile character of the soil throw it out of consideration as a wagon road route.
The route to which I give the preference, after a careful examination of all of them is as follows:
From Taos, in a southwesterly direction for about 18 miles, to a
point on the Rio del Norte called "Sienaguilla," thence through the
canon of the Rio del Norte, by cutting a roadway into the slope of the
left bank, 15 miles to La J oya; and thence by the road common to all
the routes above named, 40 miles, to Santa Fe; being in all 73 miles,
and 14 miles shorter than the present difficult and objectionable wagon
road. The greater part of the first section above named is· over easy
ground, requiring scarcely any work to make a perfect road; but on
approaching Sienaguilla there will be' some heavy work for about 3
miles, involving the crossing of two deep arroyos and the easing of
three very considerable hills.
From Sienaguilla to La Joya, for 15 miles, involving the removal
of broken rock and the cutting of the roadway into the side of the
mountain, and constituting the expensive feature of the road, but offering a grade which is scarcely a perceptible departure from the true
level, and affording the only chance for a permanent roadway to pass
the mountains.
The remaining section of forty miles requires considerable work
at certain points, such as a new location near Pojoaque, to avoid
arroyos and to be protected against their encroachments, and also a
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new location, involving much cutting and grading, along Tesuque creek,
and among the sand hills just north of Santa Fe.
The accompanying estimate shows the probable cost of effecting
this great work, and it is hoped that the importance of the route will
lead to its favorable consideration.

*

*

*

IV. ESTIMATE FOR COMPLETING THE ROAD FROM
TAOS TO SANTA FE
Section from Taos to Sienaguila, 18 miles
$ 13,500.00
Sienaguilla to La J oya, through the canon of the Rio
82,500.00
del Norte, 15 miles
From La Joya to Santa Fe, 40 miles
21,500.00
From which deduct the balance on hand of appropriation
made by act of July 17, 1854
Leaving total required for the completion of a road from
Taos to Santa Fe

$ 4,500.00
$113,000.00

All of which is respectfully submitted by your most obedient
servant,

J. N.

MACOMB

Captain Topographical Engineers.
Sept. 29, 1858.
Colonel J. J. Abert
Commanding Corps Topographical Engineers, U. S. A.
Washington, D. C.3

In 1861 an act was passed (approved March 2nd) to
provide for the completion of the military roads from Fort
Union to Santa Fe, and from Taos to Santa Fe, New Mexico..
This act carried an appropriation for the Taos-Santa Fe
road of $15,000,00. 4
The 42nd Congress passed an act 5 entiled "An Act providing for the completion of the Military Road from Santa
Fe to Taos inthe Territory of New Mexico":
Be it enacted, etc., That the sum of twentyfive thousand dollars be and the same is hereby
appropriated for the completion of the military
road from the city of Santa Fe to Fernandez de
Taos, in the Territory of New Mexico, to be ex3.
4.
5.

See Archives, War Dept.
12 . Statutes at Large, page 208.
Chap. 312, 3rd session, approved March 3, 1873.
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pended under the direction of the Secretary of
War.
Two years later the 43rd Congress provided "for the
completion of the military road from the city of Santa Fe to
Fernandez de Taos, in the Territory of New Mexico. Six
thousand six hundred and forty-four dollars and eighty
cents, in addition to the u:riexp~nded balance of the appropriation made by Act of March third, eighteen hundred and
seventy-three, which is hereby continued and made available,
to be ,expended under the direction of the Secretary of
War."6
Concerning the constructing of this road, which commenced in accordance with the recommendations of Captain
Macomb, Captain Smith H. Simpson, who came to New
Mexico in 1853 and settled in Taos a few years later, related
to the writer the following story: A detachment of army
engineers, under the comamnd of a lieutenant, started work
in the Rio Grande Canon at Cieneguilla (now called Pilar).
The lieutenant laid out the road to cross the river by a bridge
at Cieneguilla, run down the right or west bank of the river
and recross a few miles below. About $2,000.00 worth of
timbers had been collected at the above named place and
they were held by booms in the river. Some two or three
miles of the road had been opened up on the first bench west
of the river~ B~fore the grade was completed the lieutenant
was called to Washington and left the work in charge of his
first sergeant. While the lieutenant was in Washington the
men ran out of grade stakes, so to keep the men occupied, the
sergeant put the men to work blasting the rock slides on the
east or left bank of the river, as they had a large quantity
of black powder. They found the slides did not respond to
their blasts, sO,before the lieutenant returned, they had a
road practically opened down the left bank where the road
now is. Upon his return, the lieutenant on looking over the
situation, ordered the booms cut and the timbers went on
down the river. The road was completed on the east side.
6. Chapter 130, 43 Congress, 2nd session.
Approved March 3, 1875.
'

1854 Statutes at Large, Page 391.
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This road, from Taos to and through the Rio Grande
Canon, has since been known locally as 'lEI Camino Militar."
As the present road from Santa Fe to Taos and on to Fort
Garland, Colorado, follows in the main the line established
and used by the soldiers, it would seem that to retain the
name EI Camino Militar would be fitting and appropriate.
Who knows but that this road leading from Santa Fe to
Fort Garland, being the shortest and most direct line between the industrial sections of Colorado and the heart of
New Mexico and on to the border, may again become of
great strategic importance as a military road.

FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER

III

EXTERMINATION-A FRONTIER PANACEA

of the Civil War resulted in a temporary disT
ruption and weakening of the military organization in
the Apache country.· This situation was produced by a
HE END

gradual mustering out of the California Volunteers and an
order from the war department which ended the enlistment
of new troops. To prevent the complete collapse of military
control on the Apache frontier, the secretary of war made
an exception to the order on May 20, 1865, and allowed the
recruitment of a regiment of Arizona Volunteers. Six companies composed of a total of three hundred and fifty men
were immediately enrolled under the supervision of General
McDowell. Half of the new troops were posted in southern
Arizona and the others were moved to the Prescott area.!
No military activity occurred in Arizona until McDowell visited the district in December. Then the advantage of having the department commander close at hand
became very apparent. First, certain groups of Pinals and
Coyoteros that had practically cut off the delivery of supplies to Fort Goodwin, were easily overawed by commands
sent out from Camp Grant. 2 Next, all the Arizona Volunteers were concentrated at Camp Lincoln for service in the
Verde Valley. The government gave scant attention to the
troops' needs and much hardship resulted; however, their
activities were quite effective. On February 11, 1866, Lieutenant Manuel Gallegos with forty-five men moved down the
1. Dept. of California, Annual RepOrt, 1886, A. G. 0., 632; Report of the Adjutant-General, Oct. 1, 1866, in Journal of the Third Legislative Assembly, Pp. 250-254.
One hundred and eighty-eight of the Arizona Volunteers were Maricopa Indians.
2. Col. T. F. Wright to A. A. G., Jan. 24, 1866, Dept. of Calif., Annual Report,
1886, A. G. 0., 632.
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valley after a band of marauders. The command, operating
only at night, succeeded in locating a large rancheria strongly
fortified within a series of caves and caverns. A battle of
several hours duration followed, but despite the fact that
thirty warriors were killed and twelve wounded, the band
could not be dislodged. 3 Similar commands led by Lieutenant Thomas Ewing and Primativo Cervantes struck the
Indians north of the Salt River several severe blows in
March, killing forty-two of them and wounding many
others. 4
Such unusual punishment forced the Apache hostiles
into southern Arizona where they renewed their raids with
increased vigor. They probably would have ravaged the
region with impunity had not General McDowell, still in the
district, ordered troops from Fort Grant into action. As a
result, Lieutenant John B. Urmy scoured the region for
eleven days, travelled 225 miles, burnt 250 wickiups and
killed six IIldians from a hostile band he overtook by accident. 5 General McDowell had scarcely started back to his
headquarters, however, when the troops ceased their activities. With the exception of forty-one Indians killed and
captured in the Verde valley in April, no further punishment followed for several months. 6
The breathing spell afforded by the troops' inaction
gave the civil authorities an opportunity to express their
views. Superintendent Leihy was quite critical of the military. Their work, he said, tended to embarrass and complicate the Indian difficulties. He was of the opinion that
one-tenth of their expenditures during the past on "fruitless" operations would have provided comfortable homes
for all the Indians in the territory.7 Delegate Poston stated
that "the military authorities assume to be the government,"
3.
4.
Green,
5.
6.
7.

Capt. H. S. Washburn to A. A. G., Feb. 15, 1866, ibid.
Ewing to Col. C. E. Bennett, Mar. 9, 1866, ibid; Washburn to Capt. John
Mar. 26, 1866, ibid.
Urmy to A. A. G., Mar. 5, 1866, ibid.
Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, April 30, 1866, ibid.
Lejhy to D. N. Cooley, May 18, 1866, 1. 0., L 155.
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and more poignantly, he charged that the officers and men
sent to the Indian country were rendered ineffective because of their lack of frontier experience.8 Governor Goodwin wanted "fair, open and persistent war" until the savages were "exterminated" or forced to "bow their necks in
submission." Then they were to be put on reservations and
"made to labor or starve," so there could be "no patched up
treaty to benefit speculators in beef."9 One J. D. Cusenbury
wrote President Johns-on regarding the inadequate number
of troops, the incompetency of the commander and of the
officers' belief in extermination. Such an extreme policy
was favored, he said, because of the lack of any formulated
plans or arrangements for dealing with the Indians in case
they should wish to surrender. Prophetically, he declared
that 10,000 men and several years would be required to kill
all the Apaches; but over-sanguinely, he predicted that
they could be placed on a reserve in one year and made selfsustaining in two. 10
Expediency was still the governing factor, unfortunately, and although the views expressed contained much
truth, yet ideas rather than policies were being advanced.
Leihy came close to a sound policy when he wrote that adequate material provision would bring most of the bands to
the reserves; but he was visionary in his view that such
care would "soon" make them self-sufficient, and that the
"few" remaining out "would be hunted down and killed by
the adventurous prospectors and miners."ll
A reorganization of the army on July 28, 1866, in:"
creased its bureaucratic nature. The country was divided
into military divisions and Arizona, as a district of the Department of California, became a part of the Division of the
Pacific. For purposes of Apache warfare western New
8. Poston to Cooley, May 17, 1866, I. 0., P 132.
9. Goodwin to Cooley, May 17, 1886, ibid.
10. Cusenbury to Andrew Johnson, May I, 1866, P 148.
11. Leihy to Cooley. May 18, 1866, 1. 0., L 155. The citizens of Tucson were
reported to be paying a group of Tame Apaches one hundred dollars for each hostile
scalp brought in. Dr. C. H. Lord to Cooley, June 4, 1866. 39 Cong., 2 sess., IH. E. D.
no. I, vol. ii, p. 112.
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Mexico should have been combined with Arizona, but reasons of economy made it expedient to include the former
area in the Division of the Missouri. The reorganization
further provided for the replacement of all volunteer troops.
with regular army personneJ.12
No important results followed the military reorganization, but McDowell, weakened by the loss of his Arizona
Volunteers, was inclined to use peaceable measures. The
Indians of the Verde Valley, because of their recent punishment, were also inclined towards peace. Colonel Bennett
was therefore ordered to accept them as prisoners of war
at Fort McDowell, where they were to be aided in agriculture. A party had come in on May 28, made arrangements
to surrender most of their fellow tribesmen, and would
have succeeded had not the presence of a strong number of
Pimas frightened them away. Likewise, the presence of
other unfriendly bands near Fort Goodwin had prevented
the Indians of the Verde from collecting there; yet in the
hope that they might later come to Fort McDowell, Bennett
was now ordered to continue negotiations. 13
Conditions in western Arizona had grown worse. The
eight hundred Yavapai who had gone to the Colorado River
Reservation in 1865 14 were thoroughly dissatisfied within
a few months. Poor crops, quarrels with the Mohaves, the
greed and arrogance of the whites, and especially the government's negligence in furnishing subsistence made them
hate the sedentary life. As a result, the entire number in
the spring of 1866 fled back to the mountains of central
12.
39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 5, 17.
General H. W. Halleck was given command of the Division of the Pacific, with
instructions from General Grant "to exercise his discretion as to the mode and
manner of preventing Indian hostilities . . . in' the Territory of Arizona." This
carte blanche from Grant was quite in contrast to his action the year before in
curbing the "too extended" plans aimed against the Apaches. Edwin M. Stanton to
James Harlan, July 11, 1866, I. 0., W 377; McDowell to A. A. G., Mar. 23, 1866,
1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
13. MsDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, 39 Cong.,--2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, voL
~ii,

p. 35 . .

14.

Ct. supra, N. M. HIST. REV., xiv, 363.
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Arizona, there to resume their life of hunting androbbing.15
The Indians would doubtless have refrained from violence had not the freighters and frontiersmen attacked and
killed them at every opportunity. Retaliation followed near
Date Creek in the killing of a prospector and the burning
of a cabin. A posse of citizens from Hardyville immediately
sought revenge by slaughtering ten Yavapai men, including
the head chief Wauba Yuma, and also several women and
children. Such indiscriminate murder of fairly friendly
Indians produced a recurrence of the critical conditions of
the year before. 16 Traffic almost stopped west of Pres:.
cott; trains moved with military escorts. . Lieutenant Oscar
Hutton, sent to the region in July, killed no Indians at first;
but he destroyed their resources and thus made the situation worse by leaving the bands more destitute than beforeP
On August 11 his command and a train he was escorting
through Skull Valley were attacked by one hundred and
fifty impoverished warriors who demanded the contents of
the wagons. A parley followed, but it broke up in a severe
battle in which the Indians were worsted with heavy loss.
Leihy, certain that costly retaliation would follow, considered the victory a defeat. 18 The situation was further
aggravated by the withdrawal and discharge of the Arizona Volunteers at Date Creek and Wickenburg. 19
General McDowell, in the meantime, had become less
certain with regard to a proper Apache policy; yet he believed that the punishment given the Indians was worthwhile, and in August he ordered the regular troops to be
as active as the Arizona Volunteers had been. But that he
also favored pacific methods is shown by his satisfaction
. 15. John Feudge to Leihy, July 31. 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 111; G. H. Dorr to Leihy, Jan.· 5, 1866, 1. 0., L 5. Chief Cushackama induced
one hundred of his followers to stay on their farms.
16. Leihy to Cooley. April 12, 1866, 1. 0., 1. D.
17. Hutton to P. A., Aug. I, 1866, A. G. 0., 632.
18. The Indian loss was thirty-three killed and fifteen captured. Hutton to
Capt. G. W. Downey, Aug. 14, 1866, A. G. 0., 632. See also Leihy's account, 1. 0.,
L 239.
19. McDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, op. cit.
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with the results attained at Fort Goodwin, where several
hundred Apaches were collected. This attitude of indecision indicated that the general favored both peace and war,
whichever might prove to be the most expedient. 20
The military, from the standpoint of war, made an auspicious start. Captain George R Stanford, in late September, moved from Fort McDowell to Meadow Valley, ninety
miles distant, where an unknown Apache rendezvous was
discovered. He attacked a large rancheria on October' 3,
killed fifteen warriors, captured seven noncombatants and
destroyed their vast store of winter supplies. More important, the ease of the outward march by way of the Sierra
Ancha Range and the equally easy return near the base of
the north Mazatzal Peak proved the feasibility of the new
route into the hostiles' country.21
Captain Stanford led another expedition into the same
.region on November 14. This time he moved his lightly
equipped command of sixty-four men farther on into the
Tonto country. Before the Indians were aware of the intrusion, he attacked one of their large encampments located
in a box canyon thought to be impregnable. The result was
meager-six slain and five captured-but all the bands of
the area were completely discomfited. For several months
they gave no further trouble. 22
At this point the military of southern Arizona took a
forward-looking step, which, unfortunately, met the disapproval of higher authority. Colonel Guido Ilges of Fort
Grant, in accordance with instructions from his immediate
20. Ibid., p. 86.
21. Stanford to A. A. G., Oct. 9, 1866, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. I, vol.
ii: p. 124 et .eq.
The success of the expedition decided Halleck in favor of a forced peace by "a
hunt of extermination." Orders therefore followed for the establishment of a post,
Camp. Reno, in the new area. A trail was also to be projected from Fort McDowell
to the camp. Gen. Orders no. 89, Oct. 81, 1866, ibid., p. 94.
22. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, PP. 188-140.
The Indians of southern Arizona were kept quiet during the year by the establishment of Camp Wallen on Babacomari Creek, and by the operations of Lieutenant
Winters in the Huachuca and Mule Mountains. W. H. Winters to Maj. Harvey Brown,
Dec. 18, 1866, ibid., pp. 141-144.
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superior, Colonel Charles S. Lovell, made a treaty of peace
with several chiefs of the Aravaipa, Tonto and Pinal
Apaches. The Indians agreed on December 20 to settle
upon a reservation where they were to remain at peace, but
they reserved the privilege of making extended hunting
and food-gathering expeditions to supplement the governmental subsistence that Ilges promised them. 23
General McDowell immediately ruled that the treaty
was "irregular, injudicious and embarrassing." He contended that the officers only had authority to grant armistices, and that they had made promises impossible to fulfill.
To keep the chiefs from suspecting perfidy, he recommended
that the peace terms be greatly restricted so that the Indians
without the prescribed reserve limits could be considered
hostiles. General H. W. Halleck sustained McDowell and
ordered him to admonish Lovell and Ilges sharply for their
assumption of authority.24 Both the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs also disapproved of the treaty, but they sanctioned the idea of a peaceful solution and stated that since the reservation system had
been a success with other Indians there was no reason why
it should be unsuccessful with the Apaches. They instructed
the new superintendent to cultivate all chiefs inclined
towards peace. 25
The office of Indian affairs replaced Superintendent
Leihy in September, 1866, with G. W. Dent, General Grant's
brother-in-law. Commissioner Mix, in notifying Dent of
his appointment, requested a full report of conditions in
Arizona. He also asked him to administer his office eco23. Ilges to A. A. G., Dec. 20, 1866, A. G. 0., 163 P.
24. McDowell to A. A. G., Feb. 8, 1867, 1. 0., W 433; A. A. G. to McDowell, Feb.
9, 1867, 'ibid.
25. Secty. of Int. to C. E. Mix, Sept. 7, 1867, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Mix to Secty. of
Int., Sept. 7, 1867. ibid.; Mix to Dent, Sept. 20, 1867, L. B. no. 84, p. 310.
The territorial legislature, probably for economic reasons, opposed peace. They
remonstrated that the feeding system was u a monstrous and most expensive farce. tJ
Journal of Third Legislative Assembly, pp. 43, 261.
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nomically.26 The new appointee took charge on December
19 in the face of a hostile military opposition. Thus irked,
he became quite critical. According to his view, the territory was in a deplorable condition, chiefly because the military's "ostensible demonstration" against the savages was
"purposeless for the public safety." To reduce the hostiles
properly, he advocated an "active, offensive, persistent,
combined and simultaneous war," in which "they should
be hunted to death with fire and famine." One or two such
campaigns would reduce 'them sufficiently for the civil authorities to assume control; other plans, he was certain,
would only intensify the problem. Opposed to McDowell's
view that a lack of subsistence generated the Indians' hostility, he attributed their ferocity to their jealousy of the
whites. 27
The situation in western Arizona soon gave Dent's
statements much weight, for Yavapai and Tonto attacks
on wagon trains became a matter of daily occurrence. R. C.
McCormick, now governor, sent out a force of rangers that
quickly killed a considerable number of the marauders.
This result alarmed the superintendent and he begged for
more regular troops, stating that a general massacre of the
peaceable Indians along the Colorado River would follow,
should it be proved that any of them had joined in the
raids. 28
The military, in fact, had already taken steps to relieve the situation. General J. 1.. Gregg, with a number of
new troops, was placed in command of the District of Pres26. Mix to Dent, Sept. 8, 1866, I. 0 .• Ariz. Misc.
No reasons were found for the change of officials. Leihy did not live to be
relieved. On November 18 he and his clerk, H. C. Evarts, were murdered east of
La Paz by a band of hostiles who thought that the killing of a "great chief" among
the whites would lead to the evacuation of the region. Levi Ruggles to Comm., Nov.
28, 1866, 1. 0., R 219.
27. Dent to L. V. Bogy, Dec. 31, 1866, 1. 0., D 116..
28. Dent to Bogy, Mar. 5, 1867, 1. 0., D 257.
At this time, the inroads of the miners in the Bradshaw Mountains caused two
hundred of the Yavapai to seek peace at Fort Whipple. Since no policies had been
promulgated, the opportunity was lost. Gen. J. 1. Gregg to Dent, April 12, 1867,
Ariz. Misc.
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. cott and the Upper Colorado early in 1867. To guard
against a recurrence of the outrages of 1866, he was instructed to keep commands moving throughout the troubled
area, and a new post, Camp McPherson, was to be established at Date Creek. General McDowell demanded that no
time be lost in waging a vigorous and aggressive war. 29
General Gregg complied in full measure. In April, he
issued orders designating as hostile all Apaches and all Colorado River Indians not found on reserves. He even included
some bands on the California side of the river. Active operations were to start at once and Indians holding passes issued
by the civil authorities were to receive no immunity.30
These drastic orders resulted in a year of military
wrangling practically devoid of constructive results. McDowell decided that wholesale war against a large body
of friendly Indians, facing starvation because of congressional negligence, was inhuman. He therefore declared
Gregg's orders too stringent and directed their modification. 31 Again Gregg erred. His new orders, on June 11,
directed that Indians heretofore hostile were to be considered peaceable except when acting in concert as a tribe.
Isolated attacks and thefts by individuals were not to be
taken as hostile acts, but "as offenses against the common
law, the same as if committed by white citizens." Moreover, he announced that it was impossible to reconcile the
commanding general's present views with those promulgated for the government of the district the year before. 32
29.
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McDowell immediately branded his subordinate as an uncooperative popularity seeker who had seriously injured the
military service. He directed that existing orders of war
against "hostile Indians in Arizona" be carried out, and
to make his disapproval emphatic, issued special orders
setting forth Gregg's mistakes. 33
While the superior officers were thus wasting their time,
some of the subordinates showed commendable zeal. Captain J. M. Williams with eighty men moved from Fort
Whipple, in April, to the upper Verde, where a strong band
of hostiles threatened the region. Two spirited fights followed in which fifty-five savages were killed; these blows
completely disorganized the bands, and practically relieved
Prescott from danger on the east. 34 Likewise, Colonel Ilges
and Captain J. H. Vanderslice, from Fort McDowell, combed
parts of the Tonto, lower Verde and Mazatzal regions.
They accomplished little, although their scouts sharply reduced the horse-stealing forays said to emanate from those
isolated points. 35
The general situation as shown by these scouts perplexed General Gregg. . He found his twenty-seven companies, scattered as they had to be, quite inadequate for the
tasks of subjugation and preservation of peace. The great
size of the district, the roughness Of its terrain, the number
and frequency of desertions, the shortage of citizen employees and the smallness of the posts were insuperable problems to the district commander. But instead of seriously
considering these difficulties, McDowell chided Gregg for
beginning more wars than he could carry out, especially
when the Indians wanted peace. 30 The burden was thus
thrust back into the subordinate's hands, proving that expediency was still the rule of action.
33. McDowell to Gregg, July I, 1867, I. 0., Ariz. Miac.
34. Williams to A. A. G., April 27, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol.
ii, pp. 150-153.
35. Ilges to Lt. J. W. Lewis, April 30, 1867, ibid., pp. 153-154; Vanderslice to
Lewis, May 10, 1867, ibid., 154-157.
36. A. A. G. to Gregg, May 18, 1867, op. cit.
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Major Roger Jones was now sent to Arizona to give the
district a thorough investigation and to make recommendations. He was quite appalled with the situation. Men were
killed at various points along his route; stock was stolen
within sight of one post he visited; nothing was safe-much
less so than when he first saw the region in 1857-1859. He
considered the troops practically powerless, and suggested
several radical changes: (1) the organization of Arizona
into a separate department to eliminate the three months'
time required for the transmission of orders to and from
the Presidio; (2) the concentration of the troops at a fewer
number of posts in order to provide more effectives for
scout duty; (3) the provision of facilities to mount the
infantry when the regular cavalry was overburdened; and
(4) the erection of better quarters and hospitals to prevent
inefficiency and desertion. 37
Jones' report was obviously a constructive one, but despite its logical approach towards a military solution of the
Apache problem, McDowell sent Halleck a ten-page letter
of rebuttal on August 14. He denied the soundness of the
major's findings throughout and in an elaborate elucidation
of his own administration justified the existing conditions.
But his sharp analysis of the military problems inadvertently stamped him as a soldier with an attitude of defeat. 38
General Gregg, meanwhile, became an exponent of
pacific methods, and he evinced much concern about certain
peacefully inclined Indians of the Verde and Bradshaw
'regions. Elaborate instructions left him practically unrestricted. He was given full authority to: (1) receive and
support them if they wished to give up; (2) consider them
hostile if they did not surrender; (3) provide for them if
the superintendent could not; or (4) collect, guard and economically ration them in some unsettled locality until the
37. Jones to A. A. G., June 5, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. '1, vol. ii, p.
101; Jones to Gen. J. B. Fry, July 15, 1867, ibid., pp. 83-84.
38. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 87 et seq. For a detailed discussion .of McDowell's report, see Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New
York, 1938), pp. 165-168.
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office of Indian affairs could assume charge. 39 Whatever
results Gregg achieved remain unreported.
General Halleck was next to take up the problem of
Apache control. Moved, doubtless, by the serious conditions
near Prescott, but more perhaps by the critical attitude of
the territorial legislature,40 he made an exhaustive report
to the adjutant general on September 18. He admitted the
weakness of defense in the west, but attributed it to the fact
that only one-ninth of the available strength of the army
was assignd to his extensive division. Of the forty-seven
companies allotted to the Department of California, twentyeight were posted in Arizona, where, he pointed out, the
inadequacy of their numbers had rendered them almost
powerless. Furthermore, he could see no prospects for a
safe and permanent settlement of the troubled region until
the bitterly hostile Indians were either conquered or destroyed. In any case, they would have to be segregated from
the whites and kept under rigid military control. Concentration of troops, he. agreed, would increase their efficiency,
but decentralization was necessary to maintain the small·
scattered settlements upon which the commissary depended.
Additional troops-not less than two or three regiments,
according to his analysis-would be required if the problem
were to be solved.41
Acting Secretary of War U. S. Grant, after a study of
Halleck's report, informed President Johnson in November,
1867, that the Apaches would observe no treaties, agreements or truces. He also remarked that they were the most
hostile of the American Indians. His recommendation that
the tribe be warred upon until they were completely destroyed or made prisoners of war obviously expressed the
dominant view of the federal officials. 42
39. A. A. G. to Gregg, Sept, 10, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol.
ii, pp. 121-122.
40. Arizona Miner, Sept~ 11, 14, 17, 24, 1867; Journal of the Fourth Legisla.
tive Assembly, Pp. 33-38; 83-88.
41. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, pp. 69-74.
42. Ibid., p. 30.
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During the early part of 1868, the military instituted
action in east-central Arizona that set up a constructive
trend not to be stopped until the Apaches were subdued.
First, General T. C. Devin of the Prescott subdistrict decided to clear the savages out of the country along the eastern rim of the Tonto Basin; then he planned to make a campaign into the basin itself, where the marauders reportedly
retreated with their stolen animals and plunder. 43 While
completing details, he sent runners among the Yavapai to
induce them to go to the Colorado river; and, most fortunately, a council was arranged with the notorious Chief
Delchay of the Tontos. 44
,The council was held twenty-five miles east of Fort
McDowell. General Devin offered the Indians peace if they
would confine themselves to an area bounded by the Verde
River, the Black Mesa and the Salt River. Just what agreements were reached are obscure, but in the autumn Delchay
and his Indians actually established themselves at Camp
Reno, where some of them were retained as couriers and
guides. Others found employment gathering hay for the
post contractors. 45
General T. L. Crittenden, simultaneously, made an
agreement with the Camp Grant bands, that superseded the
one made by Colonel Ilges in 1866. However, the Indians
perfidiously broke out as soon as they received a liberal
supply of rations. Crittenden, much irked, still favored
pacific methods; nevertheless, he ordered a mild punitive
expedition into the Tonto Basin, where the culprits were
said to rendezvous. 46
General Devin, accordingly, in late April, moved with a
strong command into the relatively unknown region east of
43. According to reports, most of the stock was later traded for by an unscrupulous class of whites near Fort McDowell and Camp Reno.
44. Devin to Dent, Jan. 5, 1868, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
45. Devin to A. A. G., Jan. 8, 1868, ibid.; Vincent Colyer to F. R. Brunot (n. d),
1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 536.
The contractors paid the Indians one-half cent per pound for the hay and then
sold it to the government for three cents per pound.
46. Crittenden to Dent, Jan. 27, 1868, I. 0., Ariz. Misc.
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Camp Lincoln. He then descended into the basin proper and
for forty-five days unsuccessfully scoured the region. All
trails showed that the elusive Indians had concentrated·
towards the Little Colorado river. This fact convinced the
officers that the hostiles got their munitions from the Zunis
and Navahos. Despite the paucity of results, Devin's observations led him to believe that the most effective way to control the wild bands was to open trails directly into the heart
of their habitats. In fact, he soon made his subdistrict quiet
by this method. 47
.
Meanwhile, Captain Charles A. Whittier, send from the
Presidio, had observed the situation in Arizona at firsthand. Like Jones the year before, Whittier viewed the situation with adverse criticism. He struck at the feeding policy of his superiors, insisting that their maintenance of the
Indians as "Indian prisoners" was a violation of the law.
But he agreed that feeding was a constructive policy and one
that was essential unless the Indians were to be exterminated. As an alternative to the prevailing policy, he suggested the issuance of subsistence paid for by regular appropriations, which method, he insisted, would not only check .
. erratic and .defective .administrative practices, but would
also help to bring in most of the hostile bands. The peacefully inclined bands, he found, were entirely unprotected
from the unreasoning frontiersmen; for this reason he concluded that the government was doing very little to solve
the Apache problem. 48
No constructive policies resulted from Whittier's report, and as the last half of 1868 was reached, the situation
again became serious. Acting Governor H. H. Heath, in a
dilemma, asked the citizens to provide locally for their own
defense. No better method to aCcelerate the indiscriminate
slaughter of Indians could have been devised. 49 This was
47.· Devin to A. A. G., June 12, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii,
PP. 63-66.
48. Whittier to Fry, June 6, 1868, I. 0., W 1067.
49. Heath to O. H. Browning, July 23, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D., no. 1,
vol. ii, pp. 639-640.
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immediately demonstrated when the Yavapai, due to severe
epidemics of whooping cough and scarlet fever, moved away
from the Colorado river to the more healthful interior.
Although the Indians promised to return in a short time,
friction with freighters soon developed; and on September
·.25 ten friendly chiefs, including the able Cushackama, were
wantonly murdered near La Paz. Thus at one treacherous
stroke was undone all the significant work of the past. 50
Indian hostility now became widespread. At Fort
Goodwin where several ambuscades and attacks occurred,
. the commandant was authorized to seize and hold all male
Indians as prisoners until every robber and murderer was
delivered up. But the magnitude of the task prevented its
execution. 51 The killing of several whites near Fort Whipple
made the situation equally precarious in the Prescott district, and General E. O. C. Ord, the new commander of the
Department of California, received urged appeals for reenforcements. But the general was handicapped, due to a
decrease in the strength of his companies; therefore, all he
could do was to urge vigorous action with the forces available: Accordingly, twenty-seven scouts were made from the
various posts in the Apache country, but the results were
less than one dead Indian per scout. 52
General Halleck, keenly aware of the critical situation,
once more made constructive suggestions to the secretary of
war. He pointed out that neither proper protection nor
aggressive campaigns could be expected without two addi-·
tional regiments of troops. He also foresaw the need of
Indian scouts in conquering the Apaches, and asked that a
large increase.· be allowed his division. Of greater impor50. Feudge to Dent, Aug. I, 1868, ibid., p. 597; Dent to N. G. Taylor, Oct. 16,
1868, I. 0., D 1606.
Federal Judge H. H. Cartter, who considered it no harm to kill any Indian,
refused to take action against the culprits. Col. L. B. Young to Dent, Oct. 15, 1868,
ibid. Cf. 8upra, footnote 15.
51. A. A. G., to Capt. R. F. O'Beirne, Aug. 8, 1868, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
52. Devin to A. A. G., Aug. 28, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol.
iii, PP. 66-68; Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1868, ibid., p. 51; Dent to Comm., Dec. I, 1868,
1. 0., D 1690.
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tance, he recommended that Arizona be constituted a separate military department. 53
No important action followed the general's suggestions; consequently, without any definite planning by
responsible officials, the temporizing policy of expediency led
to a chaos of conflicting opinions that reached its height in
1869. Naturally, the frontiersmen were certain that a large
troop increase and a relentless war against the savages
would be a definite solution, but many officials with administrative considerations in their minds were not so assured.
General Ord in showing that a post of one hundred and fifty
men required an annual outlay of $3,000,000 bluntly stated
that war was the economic basis of the territory and that
perhaps it was desirable to reduce "the number of troops in
the country to the minimum consistent with the interests
of the whole countrY."54 In fact, General George Thomas',
support of Ord's views convinced General Sherman that the
occupation of the Southwest was premature and that the
cost of maintenance was out of proportion to the results.
"The best advice I can offer," he wrote, "is to notify the settlers to withdraw and then to withdraw the troops and leave
the country to the aboriginal inhabitants."55
Despite the adverse views of the high military, General
Ord decided against a "temporizing policy." He ordered his
troops to capture, root out and hunt the Apaches as they
would wild animals. All officers were to he promoted in proportion to their success; and he contemplated a concentration of his troops by the evacuation of some of the small
posts that merely "invited" the Indians to attack the government herds and supply trains. 56 Before action could be instipp.

125.

53. Halleck to A. G., Sept. 22. 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D, no. 1, vol. iii,
49, 147-148.
54. Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 12455.
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tuted the general wavered and decided that the reservation and feeding system rather than war was a more effective way to bring about a reduction of the savages. Colonel
R. F. Bernard was therefore delegated to investigate the
probable success of a reserve for the Apaches. 57
Bernard soon reported that McDowell's experiment at
Camp Goodwin had resulted in failure. But he felt assured
that the Indians would make peaceful and successful farmers if, in addition to annuities, they were allowed a healthy
reserve large enough to afford hunting, planting and the
burning of mescal. 58
The report was scarcely made before conditions
throughout the Apache country became worse than they had
been for many months. The Yavapai stopped commerce in
every part of western Arizona, one hundred whites were
killed in a short time, mails moved under escort, picket posts
had to be maintained near all settlements and the Overland
Route was besieged at all points. Ord, thoroughly. bewildered, was more inclined to use pacific methods than ever
before. He immediately recommended that a suitable reservation be established at a point completely isolated from
the whites. 59
.
As a result of Ord's views, Colonel John Green was sent
into the remote White Mountain country in July, 1869, to
prospect for a suitable reserve location and to select a satisfactory site for a proposed post; ostensibly, hi~ expedition
57. Bernard to Ord, Mar. 23, 1869, I. D., W 260.
58. Ibid., The Weekly Arizonian (Mar. 23, 1869) in pointing out that 2,000
Indians had been simultaneously fed and fought without results for two years, in~
ferred that the war had been "conducted for some distinct motive."
59. Devin to Jones, April (?), 1869, A. G. 0., Old Records Division, Dist. of
Ariz., pp. 104-106; Ord to Secty. of War, April 20, 1869, I. D.
Near Fort Bayard many Mexicans were murdered and travellers were chased
to the immediate grounds of the post. ( New M e",ioan, May 2, 1869. ) The San
Pedro region lost nearly all of the one hundred original settlers who were there in
1867. (Weekly Arizonian, June 19, 1869.) Pima county alone from January 2, 1868,
to July 13, 1869, lost in k.ilIed, captured and wounded about thirteen per cent of its
total population of 5,500.persons. (Ibid., July 17, 24, 1869.) Major Jones informed
General R. B. Marcy on July 21 that 7,300 Apaches, exclusive of the Yavapai and
Pinals, were hostile, and that the region from Prescott into Sonora was completely
paralyzed. A. G. 0., 1010 P.
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was intended as a mild demonstration against the Indians.
The command of one hundred and thirty men had scarcely
penetrated into the southern part of the region before they
learned that the villages to the north were growing heavy
crops of corn. Since the campai.gn was a retaliatory one,
Captain John Barry with sixty men was sent to destroy the
Indians' resources and to exterminate as many of the tribesmen as possible. But Barry was so impressed with their
desire for peace that he ignored his orders, rejoined Green
and was later exonerated. Green as a result of the expedition reiterated his belief in extermination. Yet he insisted
that the Coyoteros, if properly managed and protected by a
post in the region, could easily be placed on a reserve where
they would form a nucleus for the civilization of all the
Apaches. 60
Unfortunately, all the other Apache bands grew more
formidable, and by fall much of the territory was practically
lost to white enterprise. During July the mails were stopped,
the cavalry was frequently forced to retire from the field,
and the Vulture mine at Wickenburg, the sole dependence of
the legislature, was kept open only because General Thomas
ordered continuous scouting between the mine and the
mill. 61 In central Arizona the Toritos resumed their characteristic tactics of thieving and plundering; and Cochise's
bands, in the southeastern part, not only threatened to drive
civilization out, but completely frustrated the troops operating from Fort Bowie. 62 The general situation at the end of
1869 proved that no substantial progress had been made in.
Apache management. 63
60. All accounts of the officers connected with the expedition are printed in 41
Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 544 et seq. Green's findings, especially.'his
proposal that the bands could be induced to fight against each other, were of extraordinary value in later Apache relations.
61. Weekly Arizonian, July 31, Aug. 7, 1869; Green to Parker, Nov. 6, 1869,
I. 0., A 561.
62. Bernard to Devin, Oct. 22, 1869, A. G. 0., 925 P; Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 25,
Oct. 9, 16, 1869; Col. Frank Wheaton to Andrews, Dec. 8, 1869, L 0., Ariz. Misc.
63. The civil authority had exercised little leadership for three years. Superintendent Dent after his appointment late in 1866, appears to have interested himself
in graft. especially in connection with an irrigation project he constructed on the
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The year of 1870 saw the start of a new era in Apache
control. Nothing spectacular was accomplished, but action
was initiated which eventually led to the elimination of the
Apache problem. This activity centered mainly in the creation of Arizona as a separate military department and in
the measures undertaken to control the Coyoteros. Yet the
year began darkly for the settlers, for killings, attacks and
robberies were a matter of daily occurrence. 64
Governor A. P. K. Safford, thoroughly dismayed with
the situation, had already instituted action which permanently affected Indian affairs in the Southwest. During the
previous November, in the East, the governor carefully discussed the Apache problem with numerous federal officials
and New York journalists. Editorials· soon became less'
pacific in tone and the eastern public began to feel horrified
at the continued atrocities of the Apaches. 65 With Territorial Delegate McCormick he presented the case to President Grant, General Sherman and the secretary of war;
McCormick also aired the situation before congress. 66
Meanwhile, on April 15, 1870, the war department made
Arizona and southern California a separate department
with General George Stoneman in command. Reorganiza64. Memorial and Affidavits Showing Outrages Perpetrated by the Apache Indians
tn the Territory of Arizona During the Years 1869 and 1870 (San Francisco, 1871), p. 3.
From July 17, 1869 to July 23, 1870, Pima county lost forty-seven persons killed, six
wounded and one captured.
65. Excerpts printed in Wee/ely Arizonian, Feb. 5, 12, April 30, and July 30,
1870.
66. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1870. McCormick, in striking at New England
opposition to a vigorous Indian policy in the West, aroused much comment when he
sbowed that Cotton Mather had urged the extermination' of the northeastern tribes.
Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 24, 1870.
Colorado River Reservation. Dent generally looked upon Indian management with
a pessimistic attitude, but in keeping a large number of Yavapai. potential marauders
at work, he probably reduced the number of hostilities in western Arizona. The canal
proved to be. a failure and. after much criticism, he resigned on June 'I, 1869. For a
discussion of the episode, see Farish, vol. iv, p. 316 et seq.
Colonel C. S. Andrews, at President Grant's direction, replaced Dent on June
17, 1869. In his first important report he said that no success could be expected
in Indian control until officials were able both to punish and to protect. He foresaw
that the rancor the whites bore for all Indians would greatly impede any civil
program. Andrews to Parker, Dec. 9, 1869, 1. 0., A 629.
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tion necessarily required his first efforts, for the eighteen
expensive isolated posts scattered over the department were
manned by less than one and one-half companies each;
therefore, to make his command effective, he kept the troops
busy for several months building roads to connect the
various posts. Fortunately, General Ord had already practically finished a new road into the White Mountains, and this
fact doubtless explained why Stoneman found the Coyoteros
so pacific and anxious for a reserve. 67
To his superiors Stoneman was not optimistic regarding the future of the Indians. They will "never be entirely
harmless," he wrote, "until they suffer the fate of all the
aboriginals that come in contact with the whites."68 And a
little later he reported that the Indians "must either starve,
steal or be fed; and as they are unwilling to do the former, it
becomes simply a question as to which is the best policy, feed
them or continue to endeavor to prevent them from
stealing."69
The new commander announced his full program in
July: permanent citizen settlements sufficiently large to
protect themselves were to b~ encouraged; camps and troops
were to be concentrated; a widespread drive with citizen
cooperation was contemplllted; mining was to be aided; and
his subordinates were "to regard as hostile all Indians not
known to be friendly." His objective was to make the troops
available for aggressive activity.70
Before the program could be developed, the devastations
of the savages necessitated a number Of isolated actions in
the eastern and southern sections of the territory. The
Yavapai and Tontos were struck effectively on several occasions; in fact, Captain R. F. O'Beirne arranged a peace
agreement with the former which lasted for several months.
Cochise was also punished, and after losing sixty-one of his
braves he retired to Camp Ord where, for several weeks, he
67. Ord to A. A. G., Oct. 10, 1870, A. G. 0., 665 W.
68. Stoneman to A. G., June 2, 1870, 1. 0., A 1074.
69. Stoneman to A. A. G., Oct. 31, 1870, A. G. 0., 711 P.
70. Weekly Arizonian, Aug. 13, 1870.
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enjoyed the full hospitality of Colonel Green. If a definite
official policy had existed to guide Green, the bloody wars
with the Chiricahuas might have been averted. But unfortunately the opportunity slipped and Cochise soon returned
to his former haunts. 71
.
Murder, robbery and destruction now reached greater
proportions in the Chiricahua country than ever before.
From August 7 to 18, twelve men were ki~led, one wounded
and $10,000 worth of property destroyed. Numerous bodies
of cavalry sent out in pursuit were repulsed with sharp
losses by Indians who displayed excellent tactics. Even a
citizen force scouted unsuccessfully. for thirty days.72 The
press, meanwhile, excoriated Stoneman for his lack of
activity, and especially for his action in removing the headquarters from Fort Whipple to Drum Barracks on the Pacific coast. Spurred to action, he issued orders on December
30, which called for "a vigorous persistent and relentless
winter campaign."73 Naturally, the campaign never materialized, for the commander was too distant from the proposed field of action.
Despite the unsatisfactory situation in much of the
Indian country, a program that promised permanent success was already inaugurated· with the strong Coyotero bands. An extensive area in eastern Arizona had, in
fact, been defined and proposed as a permanent reserve for
them a few weeks before the creation of Stoneman's command. According to arrangements the military was to put
the plan in operation; then the office of Indian affairs was
to assume control. 74 General Ord visualized the plan as a
final solution to the Coyotero troubles. He foresaw the bands
permanently isolated, surrounded by white immigration and
forced to pursue agriculture. Such results, he thought,
71. O'Beirne to A. A. G., Oc~. 26, 1870, 1. 0 .. W 1570; Green to A. A. G., Aug.
13, 1870, 1. 0 .• C 631; Weekly Arizonian, July 2, 1870.
72. Ibid., Aug. 6, 13, 27, 1870.
73. Arizona Citizen, Dec. 24, 1870, Mar. 18, 1871.
74. Special Field Orders no. 8, Mar. 5, 1870, 1. 0., Ar;"'. Misc.; Belknap to Cox, .
Mar. 5, 1870, ibid.
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would strongly encourage the wilder bands to seek peace. To
him the only alternative was extermination. 75
The management of the program fell to Colonel Green,
who was well acquainted with the Coyoteros and their habitat. First, he built a road into the center of the region; then
he established a post, Camp Ord, later called Fort Apache, .
at the road's terminils. The Indians, because of their halfstarved condition~ were eager to cooperate, and more than
1,000 of them were present on July 1 for the first count and
beef issue. By winter 2,000 were under control, industriously
cutting hay and wood which were purchased through the
cooperation of General Stoneman. Pointedly, the colonel
informed the commissioner that with subsistence and tools
a life of peace would be made more attractive than one of
war; and that if this result were attained, "their civilization would be a perfect success."76
Stoneman's other subordinates achieved no successes
during the winter,. and the spring of 1871 opened with the
usual picture of distress and woe. In March, the general returned to Arizona and ill-advisedly took steps of economy
which aroused the settlers to extreme fury. One aggressive
move, however, that of a camp in the Pinal Mountains,
frightened 550 of the Arivaipa and Pinals into Fort Grant
for safety; and strangely 1,000 Yavapai came to Camp
Verde in quest of peace. Many of the bands were now in a
position to be thoroughly crushed, but Stoneman, choosing
to control them "through the medium of their bellies," decided to try a policy of peace. He therefore asked for a
supply of meat, corn and blankets with which, he announced,
they could be induced to stay at peace on reservations. 77
Even before the establishment of the new camp, other related groups headed by Chief Eskiminzin had come to Camp
Grant where their sympathetic friend, Lieutenant Royal E.
75.
76.
T. 0., C
77.

Ord to Parker, April 1, 1870, 1. 0., A 104.
Green to ·Parker, July 7, 1870, 1. 0., G 462; Green to A. A. G., Dec. 31, 1870,
631.
Stoneman to Townsend, April 9, 1871, A. G. 0., 1582.
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Whitman, had put them to work cutting hay for the post
contractors. 78
But the leading settlers were in no frame of mind to
allow any entering wedge to their chief means of livelihood
-that of supplying the troops. Almost at once, the territorial press, the governor, the legislature, and almost all
interested groups set up a terrific tirade against the reservation or feeding system, or any other plan that promised
to bring a cessation of hostilities. 79 Indeed, the more unreasoning and aggressive elements merely awaited a pretext to
wreck the Camp Grant experiment.. This ominous situation
was further aggravated by the continued fiendish ravages of
the wild bands in the southeastern Arizona, and in April,
Stoneman was forced to revise his policy into one of mixed
peace and war. He therefore simply announced that the
Indians were to be warred upon until they became willing to
seek peace and safety on the reservations. 80
The policy would doubtless have eased the public feeling
had not a "Committee of Safety" froin Tucson made demands of the general which sharply touched his prerogatives. As a result of his tactless and caustic replies, the
committee publicly announced that "if anything further is
expected we must depend upon our own efforts for its consummation."81 .Subtle intriguers now proclaimed that the
friendly Indians at Camp Grant were responsible for all the
depredations, and that
Stoneman's policy
of peace was the
.
.
sole cause of the trouble; furthermore, a desperate attack on
a wagon train near the post settled the matter from the
frontiersmen's viewpoint. 82
78. Arizona Citizen, Mar. 11, 1871; R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 60. For graft in connection with Whitman's work see, Farish, vol. viii, p. 157; also, Prescott Miner, July
22, 1871.
79. Journals of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, p. 42.
80. General Field Orders no. 2, April 17, 1871, A. G. 0., 1360. Stoneman's action was in agreement with division instructions of August 8,
1. 0., W 1662.
General John Schofield assumed command of the Division of the Pacific in March, 1870.
81. The interview is given in the Weekly Arizonian, April 1. 1871.
82. Capt. Frank Stanwood to Schofield, May 19, 1871, I. O. 368. See also,
R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60--67.
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Immediately, the most important citizens of Tucson, led
by W. S. Oury a'nd Jesus Elias, organized an expedition of
one hundred and forty-six men with whom they planned the
most drastic retaliation. Armed and provisioned· by the
territorial adjutant general, the party set out for the Indians' camp on April 28, and two days later succeeded in staging a savage morning attack while the unsuspecting victims
were yet asleep. The gruesome work was soon ended, and
thirty minutes later the party retired without loss up the
San Pedro, leaving behind them eighty-five Indians crushed,
shot and battered to death, seventy-seven of whom were
women and children. Barbarously, twenty-nine children
were carried away into virtual slavery.83
The massacre, while strongly approved in the We'st,
caused great consternation in the East, especially among the
proponents of the peace policy. President Grant, terming
the massacre an outrage, informed Governor Safford that
martial law would be proclaimed in Arizona if the participants were not brought to trial. Accordingly, one hundred
and four men were perfunctorily tried and acquitted in
December. 84
General Stoneman was now blamed by all factions-the
citizens, the "ring" at Tucson and the peace advocates of
the East. Consequently, Safford and McCormick had little
difficulty in obtaining his removal. 85 The general had not
failed, however., Under the most adverse circumstances he
had worked out a policy, a combination of peace and war,
which was later to solve the problem of Apache control.
A policy very similar to that of Stoneman's had simultaneously been developed for the Western Apache bands of
southwestern New Mexico. But the civil authorities in New
6, 1871;
60-68;

30, 1871,

83. Arizona Citizen, May
Whitman to A. A. G.,' April
1. 0.,
A
R. B. I. C.,
pp.
McClintock, vol. i, p.
et seq. Accounts vary
as to the actual number killed. Slightly more than one hundred may have perished.
The Alta California, Feb.
covers the trial completely. J. B. Allen,
who outfitted the expedition, served as a member of the jury.
85. Arizona Citizen, May.
Richardson and Rister, The Greater South-

326.

1871,

84.

west, p.

3, 1872,

322.

20, 1871;

207
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Mexico, in contrast to those of Arizona, played a most significant part in the formation of the policy. For three years
following the Civil War, the impoverished New Mexican
bands had kept up destructive hostilities sufficiently extensive in the eyes of General John Pope to necessitate the
maintenance of Fort Cummings at Cook's Springs, Fort Selden on the Rio Grande, Fort Stanton on the Bonito, and Fort
Bayard near Silver City. Besides, numerous temporary
posts were opened to prevent the abandonment of many
widely separated settlements. One officer even felt th~t if
the Apache raids east were to be prevented, a cordon of forts
would be required from the Navaho country to Foit- Bayard. 86 On several occasions the civil officials fruitlessly suggested that supplies and a reservation would make the hostiles docile within a year'~ time. 87 '
This unsatisfactory condition prevailed until August,
1869, when Governor R. B. Mitchell; alarmed at the increased temerity of the Apaches, issued a proclamation
which designated them as outlaws subject to be killed if
found away from reservations. 88 High offiicals immediately
announced that the proclamation would interfere with ,a
contemplated permanent Indian policy, and ordered Superintendent William Clinton not to allow its "propriety or
expediency." . Serious complications would doubtless have
arisen, but a. change in governors resulted in a new proclamation with less drastic provisions. 89
This imbroglio, fortunately, had a positive effect on
Apache control, for the commissioner now decided that peace
could best be attained through the civil authority. Accordingly, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew took charge of the Southern Apaches on August 23. Drew spent several weeks with 86. Pope to Sherman, Aug. 11, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D.
29; Daily New Me",ican, Nov. 17, 1868.
87. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 193; 40 Cong.,
no. 1, vol. ii. pp. 620, 635.
88. Proclamation. Aug. 2, 1869, I. 0., N. Me",., A 329.
89. Parker to W. T. Otto, Aug. 14, 1869, R. B. no 18, p.
Clinton,< Aug. 16, 1869, L. B. no. 92, pp. 73-75; 41 Cong., 2 sess., H.
iii, p. 699.

no. 1, vol. iii, p.
3 sess., H. E. D.

492; Parker to
E. D. no. 1, vol.
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the Indians and found that Loco and his followers were
anxious for peace. They desired to plant their crops near
their old reservation site, but demanded the right to hunt
over a vast area that extended even east of the Rio Grande.
Sagaciously, the agent urged his superiors to make "judicious arrangements."oo
The Indians became more destitute as cold weather
approached and the agent realized that if peace were not
made devastations would reach great proportions during the
winter. Therefore, on October 10 he met Chief Loco at
Canada Alamosa for a peace powwow. In addition to Loco,
Chiefs Victorio, Lopez, Chastine and several Mescalero
leaders were present. This fact indicated to Drew that the
bands through cooperation were becoming more formidable.
An agreement was made whereby Loco was to collect the
groups and hold them at peace near Canada Alamosa, while
Drew was to do his utmost to get the "Great White Father"
to furnish food and clothing. 01
The chiefs adhered faithfully to their agreement; but
as weeks passed with only half rations available, the bands
grew more threatening, especially when they realized they
were likely to be attacked by groups of citizens opposed to
any plan that promised peace.92 Yet Drew held the Indians
fast. He visited their camps frequently, reassured them of
the government~s intent, and sometimes showed his trust by·
staying overnight with them. Finally, on January. 5, 1870,
just at the moment when he despaired, word was received
that the office of Indian affairs had allowed $2,800 to meet
the agreement of the past October. 93 An outbreak was thus
prevented; moreover, with the favorable example of the
Navahos before them,04 and with many bad whites and MexDrew to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1869, ibid., pp. 690-691.
Drew to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1860, r. 0., C 612.
Drew to Clinton, Dec. 12, 1860, I. 0., C 801.
Drew to Clinton, Jan. 5, 1870, r. C., N. Me",., C 840; Gen. G. W. Getty to
Mo., Jan. 4, 1870, ibid., C 664.
Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858:1880," in N ..
RIST. REV., xiii, pp. 36 et seq.

90.
91.
92.
93.
Dept. of
94.
MEX.
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icans around them, the Apaches had other strong reasons
for choosing peace. By October, 1870, seven hundred and
ninety Indians, including .Cochise and some of his bands, had
collected at Canada Alamosa. 95
A constructive conference soon followed between Cochise and W.·F. M. Arny, a special agent sent out to count
the bands and to promote peace. 96 The chief was eager "to
hear what the Great Father had to say," but indicated that
his bands were desirous of peace and security. He promised
to bring in all his braves and keep them at peace, provided
the government would furnish provisions and clothing.
Arny, unauthorized to make an agreement, reported to the
commissioner that the time was most opportune for a permanent peace if the government really cared to take the
necessary steps. He recommended a general issue of one
thousand blankets to the bands as well as a small, daily
ration issue to each Indian who would remain at the agency
during the winter. He also recommended the establishment
of a permanent reserve far out in the Apache country where
the various groups would be thoroughly isolated from the
contaminating influences and liquors of the unscrupulous
whites. No treaty was to be made, the reservation was to be
surveyed, and agency buildings were to be erected. The Indians were then to be cared for on the reserve and those who
stayed away were to be "considered as at war" and "dealt
with accordingly." Until arrangements could be completed,
he advocated a continuance of the feeding policy at Canada
Alamosa. His plan, he felt, was the only one that would prevent the ultimate extermination of the savages. 97 No less
important were the views of the new agent, A. G. Hennisee,
who predicted that if the plan were properly supported 2,000
Apach~s would be at peace by the end of the year. 98
95. Pope to A. A. G., Oct. 31, 1870, 41 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, pt. ii, p. 8;
Lt. A. G. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 22, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., C 1866.
96. Parker to Clinton, Mar. 26, 1870 (n. f.).
97. Arny to Parker, Oct. 24, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., A 1502; same to same, Nov. 5,
1870, ibid., A 1518. Cochise reported that many of his braves had fallen and that
the women greatly outnumbered the men. Ibid., 1579.
98. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 31, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 104. Hennisee became
agent following Drew's death on June 5, 1870.
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These field reports aroused keen interest among Washington officials. Vincent Colyer, secretary of the board of
Indian commissioners, informed Secretary Delano that
Hennisee's success demonstrated "beyond question" that
with larger appropriations "the whole of the Apaches might,
long before this, have been brought into peaceful relations
with the government." Delano, now convinced that feeding
was cheaper than military action, asked at once for $30,000
to "subsist, maintain peace, and promote civilization among
them."99 Since no funds were available for diversion from
the regular channels, President Grant, on December 23,
shifted the burden of feeding the Indians to General G. W.
Getty of the District of New Mexico. 10o This decision now
left the field clear throughout the Apache country for a trial
of the president's "Peace Policy."
99. Colyer to Delano, Dec. 17, 1870, ibid., p. 102; Delano to A. A. Sargent, Dec.
19, 1870, ibid., p. 101.
100. Colyer to Gen. E. D. Townsend, Dec. 24, 1870, 1. 0., N. Me",., A 1598; Executive Order of Dec. 23, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 103.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE GOVERNMENT'S THORNY PEACE POLICY

The report of the Indian peace commission of 1867
aroused the whole country to the fact that the Indian service of the federal government had fallen into a sorry state. 1
Fortunately, a strong movement for reform followed the
expose, and congress', through the appropriation act of April,
1869, authorized the president to organize a board of Indian
commissioners, who were to "exercise joint control with the
secretary of the interior over the disbursement of the
appropriations made by the act."2
This provision represents both an expression of the
lack of confidence in the Office of Indian Affairs and a determination to correct some of the abuses charged against it.
The board, first organized in June, 1869, had its powers
sharply increased and modified from time to' time. Among
its more important duties during the first few years of its
existence were the supervision of' the purchase and transportation of annuity goods, and the audit of the accounts
of the Office of Indian Affairs. Members of the commission also visited the different tribes and counseled with the
chiefs and agents; they frequently escorted parties of Indians
to the cities of the North and the East; investigated, reported, and publicized the cruelties committed by white persons against the tribesmen; recommended needed changes
and improvements in the service; and championed Indian
rights throughout the nation. They served gratuitously, and
appear to have been men "eminent for their intelligence and
philanthropy," as the act required. The commission became
1. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs, its History, Activities
and Organization: in Institute for Government Research, Service Monographs of the
United States Government, no. 48 (Baltimore, 1927), p. 47; Frederic L. Pa.xson, The
Last American Frontier (New York, 1910), chap. xvii. The report itself is printed
in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 97.
2. Laws of the United States Relating to Indian Affairs (Washington, 1884),
pp. 31-32.
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at once a dominant force in determining the Indian policy
of the government.3
Along with the establishment of the board of Indian
commissioners came another important change in the administration of Indian affairs. This was President Grant's peace
policy or "Quaker Policy." Soon after his election, Grant
had a conference with an executive committee representing
the Orthodox Friends in the United States. The committee
suggested that the president appoint religious men as Indian agents and employees, believing that such persons
would have a more wholesome in'fluence over the savages
than that exercised by the grafters and spoilsmen under the
prevailing system. The president perhaps thought he saw
in the proposal a partial solution for the vexing Indian problem, or possibly he felt that here was a means for shifting
the responsibility, should failure result. In any case, he
accepted the plan and promptly adopted a new policy relative to the appointment of Indian agents by delegating their
nominations to the several religious organizations interested in Indian mission work. 4
Considerable delay was to elapse before the plan could
be instituted among the Apaches, for no official agreements
had been made with them; neither had they been assigned
to any definite reservations. However, the board of Indian
commissioners was ready to lay the necessary groundwork.
Shortly after the organization of the board, Vincent Colyer,
its secretary, while inspecting the Navaho agency near Fort
Defiance, New Mexico, met a deputation of visiting Apache
chiefs. He ascertained that they were anxious for a general
peace council, and in his subsequent report to the board
stated that a part of the wild Apaches were gathered near
Canada Alamosa, where they sought both aid and a reservation. 5 Due t? his effort~, a small amount of subsistence was
furnished the Southern Apaches during 1870, and the re3.
40
5.

Richardson, The Commanche Barrier, ·Po 324.
Ibid., ppo 324-325; Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vii, p. 109.
R. B. I. C.. , 1869, p. 55.
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suIts, according to the field reports, were encouraging enough
to instill a feeling among the members of the board that
far-reaching efforts should be made to bring about peace
with all the Apaches. 6
The board's desire for peace was also heightened by
various other significant factors. In the East there was a
growing conviction that war as a method of Indian control
was futile, and that a pacific policy should be tried. The
enormous costs of the wars, the paucity of results attained
and the outrages of the whites against the Indians were
harped upon until the most bitter prejudice was aroused
against the people of the Southwest. Even Territorial Delegate McCormick felt himself constrained to declare in congress that the "war policy" had failed and that the peace
policy must be tried. 7
The sudden development of a keen interest in the mining
possibilities of the Apache country also worked mightily for
a trial of the peace plan. Until 1869, the federal officials
stationed in the Apache range had shaped their reports to
their own selfish ends; consequently, the section was commonly represented as a barren and worthless land with
limited mineral resources. But . this view was. quickly
changed by the publication of J. Ross Browne's, Report on
The Mineral Resources of the States and Territories West
of the Rocky Mountains, and by Governor Safford's vivid
elucidation, during the winter of 1869-1870, of the fact that
a solution of the Apache menace loomed as a prerequisite to
mineral exploitation. Immediately, powerful capitalists and
mining groups interested themselves in a solution of the
Apache troubles, and generally they accepted the views of
the advocates of peace. s
Thus, with strong forces working in their favor, the
Cf. supra, pp. 37-38.
Weekly Arizonian, Feb. 28, 1869; Arizona Citizen, June 24, July 29, 1871;
Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 559; 42 Cong., 2 sess., Congo Globe, vol. cvii,
appendix, p. 397.
8. Weekly Arizonia.n, June 19, 1869, Feb. 5, 1870; C. A. Luke to Grant, April 8,
1871, I. 0., P 425. Browne's report is printed in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 202,
vol. xvi.
6.

7.
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board of Indian commissioners persisted in their aim for a
peaceful solution of the Apache troubles, and they quickly
gained considerable support from high officials;9 Early in
March, 1871, the officiaJs of the department of the interior,
strongly supported by President Grant, authorized Superintendent Nathaniel Pope of New Mexico to send Cochise and
, a select party of Apaches to Washington for a peace conference. But the attempt failed, because of the chief's
ingrained distrust of the military and the citizens, and his
lack of confidence in the intentions of the government. 10
This 'failure made the board more determined than
ever to strike directly at the Apache problem. Accordingly,
congress was induced to appropriate seventy thousand dollars "to collect the Apache Indians of Arizona and New Mexico upon reservations . . . and to promote peace and civilization among them."ll The commissioners now directed
Colyer, in his capacity as special commissioner, to visit the
Apache country to avert an expected outbreak of hostilities,
and late in May the department of the interior decided that
he should be specifically instructed to cooperate with the
military in its attempt to locate the Apaches upon the White
Mountain reservation; moreover, they agreed to allow him
one-half of the recent appropriation to effect the task. To
insure "harmonious cooperation" the war department
directed the military in Arizona to afford the special commissioner "every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object."12
Colyer,. evidently with a more elaborate program in
mind than had been planned, had a conference with President Grant at Long Branch, New Jersey, on July 13, 1871,
which resulted in a considerable enlargement of his powers.
9. Colyer to the President, Jan 7, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1879, pp. 109-110; Gov. Wm.
A. Pile to Hamilton Fish, June 19, 1871, A. G. 0., 2470. See also Delano's annual
repo>t for 1871 in 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iii, P. 10.
10. E. S. Parker to Delano, July 21, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
11. R., B. I. C., 1871, pp. 5, 35.
12. Parker to Delano, May 29, 1871, I. D.; Delano to Felix R. Burnot, May 29,
1871. I. D., L. B. no. 10; Belknap to Delano, May 31,' 1871, I. D.
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In fact, the president directed Secretary of War W. W.
Belknap to give full support to "any arrangement" that Colyer might make with the Apache bands. 13
The special commissioner proc;eeded at once to Santa
Fe, where he learned that the irate citizens near Canada
Alamosa had formally organized with the intention of exterminating all the Indians collected at the Southern Apache
agency. Fearful of a calamity that would frustrate all hopes
for peace, he hurried on with Superintendent Pope to Canada
Alamosa, and here met the spectacle of an agency without
Indians. Intelligence soon revealed that the 1,200 Indians
recently gathered there had stampeded to the mountains to
avoid the threatened massacre. Colyer now tried to arrange
a general council, but the chiefs refused to leave their hiding
places. Thus frustrated by a "few lawless white men" who
were "allowed to overturn all the good work of the government," he decided to in~pect regions more remote from
the settlements, with a view' of establishing a reservation. 14
The Colyer party, strongly escorted and fully provisioned, enter.ed the isolated Apache country of western New
Mexico and eastern Arizona at Ojo Caliente. Proceeding to
the Tulerosa valley, the special commissioner was delighted
to find that the area was ideally suited for a reservation, and
he reported that it was "remote from white settlements, surrounded by mountains not easily crossed, sufficient arable
land, good water, and plenty of wood and game." Without
delay, he declared the region beginning at the headwaters
of the Tularosa River "and extending down the same ten
miles on each side for a distance of thirty miles, to be an
Indian reservation for the sole use and occupation of the
Southern and other roving bands of Apache In.dians ..."
13. Grant to Delano, July 13, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68; Grant to Belknap,
July 14, 1871, A. G. 0., 2618.
The president's interest caused the department of the interior to invest Colyer
with power to take any action needed "for locating the nomadic tribes of those
territories upon suitable reservations." Acting Secretary to Colyer, July 21, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
14. All correspondence in the case is printed in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 69-72. See
also Colyer's letter of Aug. 22, 1871, in ibid., p. 38.
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At the same time he ordered Superintendent Pope to have
the Indians that were collected at Canada Alamosa removed
to the new reserve at onceY
. Unsuccessful in solving the Apache troubles in New
Mexico, but certain that the groundwork for an eventual
peace had been arranged, Colyer reached Camp Apache on
September 2. Colonel John Green, in .command, wasenthusiastic about the peace plan and reported that the Indians
in the immediate vicinity of the post were ready for its inception. The Indians themselves, especially Chief Miguel,
welcomed Colyer, and well might they, for a consignment of
$2,000 worth of beef, corn and clothing that he had ordered
for them when he first reached the Indian country had just
arrived. 16 In a few days, nearly four hundred Indians were
at hand, all making the most effusive professions of peace.
Colyer lost no time in designating a vast area about Camp
Apache as an Indian reservation,17 and the next day, September 7, he held a general peace council. Colonel Green as
spokesman explained to the assembled chiefs the advantages
to be derived from peace ona reservation, where rations and
supplies would be furnished free, and where the bands
would be safe from molestation. But he made it clear that all
who stayed away would be pursued and killed. The chiefs,
after insisting upon the immediate delivery of provisions
and requesting ;that their beef be delivered on hoof so that
they could get the hides and tallow, agreed to comply with
the government's demands.. A systematic distribution of
Indian goods followed, and then Colyer, convinced that the
peace plan was successfully inaugurated among the Coyoteros, prepared to leave for Camp Grant. 1S
15. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, I. 0., C 631; Executive Orders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 128; Colyer to Pope, Aug. 29, 1871, A. C. 0., 3441.
16. 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. iii, p. 543; R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 40, 72.
73, 77.
17. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, op. cit.; Colyer to Green, Sept. 5, 1871, 1. 0.,
631. For a detailed description of the reservation, see Executive O;'ders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 7.
18. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, 1. 0., C. __ 37.. Five days after the council
one Coyotero band was charged with the theft of fifteen horses from near the post,
Arizona Citizen, Oct. 7, 1871.

46

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

The Colyer party in its journey to Camp Grant penetrated directly through the heart of the Apache country.
Wherever Indians were found the special commissioner was
met with the greatest manifestations of goodwill, but the
frontiersmen looked upon him with intense displeasure. 19 In
fact, Governor Safford had taken the unprecedented action
of issuing a proclamation calling upon the citizens to receive
the federal commissioner with "kindness and hospitality."2o
But Colyer had eagerly anticipated success at Camp Grant,
and on his way west, at Lawrence, Kansas, had selected the
post "as a reservation on the west, where the Apache Indians
are to be protected and fed.:' He had also arranged for
Lieutenant Whitman to be left in charge, and at his request
the military had sent runners to bring in the peacefully disposed bands.21
No time was lost in· arranging a council. Chiefs Eskiminzin and Chiquito were present with all their followers
who had survived the massacre in the spring, and it was
obvious that their desire for peace and safety would result in
the easy collection of several hundred other tribesmen, once
they were assured that the government was sincere in its
promises. Colyer, now quite aware that a reserve at Camp
Grant was doomed to be a temporary one due to the prox19. Colyer was shamefully abused hy the frontier press during the summer, and
he erred by not giving proper attention to- the citizen's side of the question. His life
was 'even threatened on, one occasion. News reached the East that parties involved in
the Camp Gr'ant massacre intended to assassinate him to prevent the delivery of a
report to the president. Peter Cooper then asked Grant to render the special commissioner proper. protection, and Secretary Belknap actually issued a public statement to
reassure the proponents of peace. Cooper to the President, Sept. 19, 1871, A. G. 0.,
3299 ; Belknap to Cooper, Sept. 21, 1871', ibid.
20. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit. The proclamation may he found in
Arizona Citizen, Aug. 26, 1871, or in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 79-80.
21. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit.; A. G. to Crook, Aug. 2, 1871,
I. 0., A 344. Just at the time Colyer reached Camp Grant, a party of nearly
two hundred armed whites were only twelve miles from the reserve. The post officers
saw that the Indians feared another massacre, and to prevent a general stampede,
ordered the party not to approach nearer than ten miles to the post. Since this action
practically closed travel between Tucson and Florence, Crook censured the commandant,
declaring that such orders would uunnecessarily provoke the hostilities of the citizens
toward the military and the Indians." Crook to Capt. Wm. Nelson, Sept. 22, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871,
82.
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imity of a dangerous white population, attempted to induce
the Indians to remove to the Camp Apache region. But the
Indians rejected the plan, and the special commissioner, "believing it better for the sake of peace," designated a considerable area contiguous 'to the post as a reservation for all
peacefully inclined Arivaipa, Pinal and other roving bands
of Apache Indians. He made it clear to the chiefs that their
followers would suffer dire punishment if they strayed
beyond the reserve limits. On the part of the government he
agreed that, besides furnishing them subsistence, an attempt
would be made to restore the children carried away at the
time of the massacre. 22
The peace party then hurried on to Camp Verde 23 to
examine conditions in the eastern Yavapai country. Since
the Indians of this particular region were quite impoverished and exhausted, Colyer, with the aid of the post officers,
had little difficulty in collecting them for a conference. On
October 2, 1871, when the council began, the general wretchedness of the tribesmen was vividly apparent. The chief
was so weak and sick from hunger that stimulants and food
were required before he could command strength enough
to participate in the talk. No less enervated were the mass
of his followers. Danger from the whites, ineffective arms
for the chase, and a general scarcity of game were responsible for the depiorable state to which the bands had fallen.
Already the old men had resigned themselves to their fate.
Despite their condition, the Indians resisted his suggestion
of a reserve at Date Creek, but agreed that they would wel-·
come the establishment of one somewhere along the Verde
River. Accordingly, after the post officers had indicated
22. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op cit.; Executive Orders Relating to Indian
. Res'ervations, p. 3.
23. En route, at Fort McDowell, Colyer's efforts· to parley with the Tontos met
with failure. The unwillingness of the Tontos to talk peace was doubtless due to
the fact that they had come to view all peaceful overtures of the whites as perfidious.
Nevertheless. the commissioner made the post reservation a temporary Indian reservation and feeding station. He allotted the commandant $400 to buy clothing for those
tribesmen who might come to the fort later in the year. ·Colyer to Delano, Sept. 24,
1871, 1. 0.,· C 562; Colyer to Col. N. A. Dudley, Sept. 25. 1871, ibid.
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their preference for a Verde location, the commissioner
,acquiesced, by ordering that the Indians should be protected
and fed on a reserve to be twenty miles wide and to extend
upstream from the post area for forty-five miles. 24
Colyer now visited Fort Whipple for a discussion of the
Apache problem with General Crook.25 Sharp differences
were quickly uncovered and naturally so, for Colyer had
already written Delano that Crook's retention as department
commander "jeopardizes the success of the President's Indian policy here." Nevertheless, he accepted the commander's advice not to move the Yavapai of western Arizona to
the new Verde Reservation during the approaching winter,
but rather, to establish a temporary reserve for those Indians who loitered about the military post of Camp Date
Creek,26 Although the two men conferred in,the most cordial manner, Colyer had scarcely left Fort Whipple for San'
Francisco before Crook wrote General Schofield an unusual
personal letter that eventually reached the adjutant general. This communication shows that Crook, who believed
he was "to be allowed the entire settlement of the Apache
question," felt that Colyer considered himself as "the representative of the President in carrying out his (the President's) 'Pet Theory' with the Indians." Crook further
shows that the peace policy "managers" were merely using
, Colyer as an "instrument" to make it appear that a lasting
peace could be made with the "much abused and injured
Apache" were it not for the opposition of the military; and
that they were really anxious for him (Crook) to wage war
so that he "would be abused as the great North American
Butcher." In order to offset the designs of the "Policy Men,"
the general proposed to remain nominally inactive as long as
Colyer was "sitting on and controlling the valves." Colyer's
24, Colyer to Delano. Oct. 3, 1871. R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 56-57; Ezecutive Order
Files, 1. 0., I 971.
25. Cf. infra, note 27.
26. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 6. 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871. p. 57; same to same, Sept. 17,
1871, 1. D.
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peace .with the Apaches he characterized as a "humbug"
which would soon come to naught. 27
Meanwhile, Colyer reached San Francisco, conferred
with General Schofield, and. then entrained for the East.
Few details concerning their talk are known, although the
general indicated that he was pleased that Crook had been
left with the entire s.upervision of those Indians who might
choose to stay on the new reservations. However, the special
commissioner was not reassured, and by wire requested
Delano personally to see that Belknap issued no orders "looking to war" until a report could be made. 28
Colyer reached Washington on October 27, only to find
that Delano was absent from the city. Fearing that the
"contractors, politicians and Indian exterminators" might
gain the president's ear, he rushed to the White House,
where he met Secretary Belknap who had just arrived for
a cabinet meeting. Belknap, somewhat·. angered, said that
Colyer was "interfering," and indicated that he "only
awaited the President's word" to strengthen General Crook.
But the special commissioner was not to be frustrated, and
through a message to the president· received the assurance
that he would be received immediately upon Delano's return.
During the next few days he arranged "that such pressure
would be brought on the President as to stop an aggressive
war."29
President Grant took up the Apache problem with
Delano, Belknap and Colyer on November 6. After a long
and careful discussion, a general line of policy was evolved,
which Delano was directed to prepare more fully in the form
of specific recommendations. This fundamental program
completed within a few hours, stipulated that (1) the presi27. Crook to Schofield, Oct. 10, 1871, A. G. 0., 3920. In this letter Crook states
that part of his information resulted from talks that Mrs. Crook had recently had at
Washington with Secretary Delano.
28. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 19, 1871, I. D.
Schofield notified Sherman that "the President ought to know how very differently his military and civil representatives in Arizona view the Apache question."
Schofield to Sherman, Oct. 23. 1871, A. G. 0., 3920.
29. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 30, 1871, 1. D.
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dent was to designate as reservations the areas selected by
Colyer; (2) the roving bands were to be required to locate
upon the reservations, where they were to receive subsistence and protection as long as they remained friendly "with
the Government, each other, and the white people"; (3) the
braves as well as the noncombatants were to stay within
the reserve limits; (4) the whites were to be warned that the
government would protect the peaceable Indians to the full
extent of its power; (5) the superintendent of Indian affairs
was to locate at Fort Whipple; and (6) the war department
was to select "suitable and discreet" army officers to act as
Indian agents until superseded by civil agents. so
The execution of. the program devolved upon General
Sherman, and without delay he ordered the division commanders of the Division of the Pacific and the Missouri, to
comply with Secretary Delano's recommendations. Sarcastically, he pointed out that since the Office of Indian Affairs
was rarely able to provide food, the commissary department
would be required to meet the implied condition that those
Indians "acting in good faith should not be permitted to
starve." The general also stated that after a reasonable time
General Crook was to feel assured that "whatever measures
of severity" he might· adopt to bring peace would "be
approved by the War Department and the President. s1
Crook, In fact, had been quite active during the summer of 1871 despite the government's peace efforts. He
arrived unannounced in Tucson, on June 19, fifteen days
after having assumed command, and within one hour was
working on, his plans and preparing instructions. By sundown every officer in southern Arizona had been ordered to
report to him. .He then spent the next few days in consultation with every individual he could find who had any significant information that would be of value in planning a
SO. Colyer to
President, Nov. 7,
31. Sherman
L. B. vol. !iv, p.
Crook.

Delano, Dec. 20, t871, R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 59, 73; Delano to the
1871, 1. D., L. B. vol. x, pp. 326-327.
to Schofield, Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. 0., Headquarters of the Army
413. A letter to Sheridan was identical, except the reference to
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campaign against the savages. Yet the general had no intention of an immediate offensive. Rather, he looked forward to a thoroughly planned war that would bring a final
and complete success. 32
.
Action would doubtless have been deferred for an extended time, had not a sudden increase in killings and attacks in the Chiricahua country required a demonstration
against Cochise. Therefore, with the joint purpose of leading a training expedition into the field and of striking the
chief a decisive blow, Crook collected around himself some
of the most able and ambitious young officers in Arizona,
organized a command of six companies of cavalry and scouts,
and moved out for Fort Bowie on July 11. No Indians were
encountered en route, but sufficient evidence of their numbers was noted to convince the general that a permanent
peace would be impossible until the Chiricahuas were subjugated.33 News concerning Colyer's peace'mission now
ended the plan to run Cochise down, and instead, Crook
decided to move his expedition farther north, where he hoped
not only to meet some hostile parties, but also to form an
alliance with the friendly Indians near Camp Apache. 34
The command upon its arrival at Camp Apache on
August 12, was gratified to find some five hundred Indians
under Chiefs Miguel, Chiquito and Pedro, hard at work cultivating corn, which fact Crook enthusiastically reported as
"really the entering wedge in the solution of the Apache
32. 49 Cong., 1 sess., H. R. no. 531, p. 3; Arizona Citizen, June 24, 1871; Bourke,
On the Border with Crook, p. 108; Crook to A. G., Sept. 28, 1871, 42 Cong., 2 sess.,
H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, pp. 77-78. Crook's basic plans included: (1) supplies to be
brought from California by water rather than by land; (2) wagons and saddles
especially made to withstand heat and hard usage to be furnished; (3) telegraph
lines to be built into department; and (4) pack mules to be made more serviceable
by giving them extraordinarily particular care.
33. Crook to Townsend, July 10, 1871, I. 0., A 501; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 9,
1871.
34. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, p. 78.
Shortly after Crook left Fort Bowie, the beef herd was attacked within a stone's
throw of the parade ground. The Indians killed twa men and made away with thirtyeight animals. About the same time a body of troops bound for the post engaged four
. hundred savages near the' San Pedro and killed thirteen. The military suffered a loss
of four. Arizona Citizen, July 22, 29, 1871.
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Question."35 The Indians acquiesced to the general's view
that white pressure necessitated a life of peace, and he easily
enlisted a group of scouts to help him ferret out the incorrigibles. He also persuaded all the friendly Indians to enroll
their names at the post, where each of them was furnished
a writ.ten, personal description as a guarantee ~gainst violence by the whites. 36 But some of the less docile Coyoteros had gone on the warpath as a protest to the Camp
Grant Massacre, and these the general now hoped to strike
on his way to the department headquarters at Fort
Whipple. 37
The resulting reconnaissance westward to Camp Verde
accomplished little at the moment, although by the time the
post was reached the commander had formulated far-reaching plans for "concentrating on one band ... at a time until
they would submit to peace at any terms." Since orders had
just come to suspend all aggressive operations until Colyer's
mission was completed, the general pushed on to Fort Whipple "to await further developments."38
Colyer, as previously noted, ended his peace tour within a: short time and hastened back to Washington to win the
approval of his superiors. 39 But despite the fact that considerable improvement did follow among the Coyotero, Pinal,
Arivaipa and Verde bands,40 events in the Indian country
soon proved that the Apache troubles were far from settled.
On the morning of November 5, 1871, a California stage
loaded with eight passengers was attacked near Wickenhurg
35. Crook to Townsend, Sept: I, 1871, I. 0., A 570.
36.
37.

Ibid.
Ibid; Arizona Citizen, Sept.
Crook to Townsend, Sept. I,
I. 0., A
39. Cf. supra, p.
Amy to Colyer, Oct. 11,
Carr. Bd. Ind. Cams., pp.
Whitman to
Colyer, Oct.
I. D.: David White to Colyer, Nov.
R. B. I. C., 1871,

38.

40.

p.

57.

49.

20, 1871,

16, 1871.
1871,

1871,

570.

22, 1871,

3-6;

Twelve hundred Southern Apaches were located on Colyer's Tulerosa Reserve,
where they continued to depredate, but less so than formerly. Gen. Gordon Granger
to A. A. G., Sept.
A. G. 0.,
Colonel 1... H. Davis, who inspected the
agency for General Pope, decided that the new site would offer no barrier to further depredating. For this reason he counseled that the "experiment" of 'peace be
tried at Canada Alamosa. Davis to A. A. G., Oct.
A. G. 0.,

20, 1871,

3863.

25, 1871,

4047.
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by a raiding party of Apache Mohaves, said to belong to
the main group of nearly one thousand tribesmen who were
fed at Date Creek. This attack was made especially significant by the fact that of the six persons killed,41 three were
members of the Wheeler Expedition,42 one of whom was
Frederick W. Loring of Massachusetts, a young writer of
great promise, widely known' in the East. 43 The eastern
press gave,wide publicity to the killing of Loring, and many
prominent pacific-minded individuals now became convinced
that Apache affairs had been described inaccurately, "by
those who have allowed their philanthropy to outrun their
judgment and sense of justice."44
Public opinion was further influenced against the peace
efforts by a notorious and rabid western press which assailed
Colyer and the peace advocates with a deluge of journalistic execration. The pages of the Alta California and the San
Francisco Times, throughout the last half of 1871, were
filled with bitter communications from officials' and visitors
in the Apache country, and many of these tirades were reprinted in the eastern papers. Even the federal grand jury
at Tucson resorted to similar methods of propaganda, for
its report in October, largely an investigation of Indian matters, was essentially a castigation of the peace policy as inaugurated by Colyer. 45
The situation soon played' into the hands of the war
party, and upon the receipt of General Sherman's instructions,46 the military again prepared to pursue a rigorous
policy. The adjutant general suggested to Schofield that the
reserves· selected by Colyer might be abandoned, but Scho41. For details of the massacre see, Capt. Chas. Meinholt to Lt. F. H. Ebstein,
Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. 0., 4546; Wm. Krueger to W. G. Peckham, Dec. 9, 1871, in Grand
Army Journal, Jan. 6, 1872.
42. Wheeler's epochal surveys are covered in George M. Wheeler, Report Upon
Geographic Surveys West of the 100th Meridian, in charge of First Lieutenant George
M. Wheeler (Wash., '1875-1889), 8 vols.
While at Harvard, Loring had drawn the attention of James Russell Lowell.
S'ee Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1928-36), vol. xi, p. 417.
44. McCormick to Salford, Nov. '16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871.
45. The complete report is given in Arizona Citizen, Oct. 28, 1871.
46. Cf. supra, p. 50.

43.
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field apparently ignored the proposal by replying that until
the experiment of peace was tried "it would be wise not to
appoint any civilian agents for the Apaches but to leave
them under exclusive military control," because "strict
military control of the Indians on the reservations is necessary to effect the desired changes in their habits."47 Then
using Sherman's instructions as a point d'appui, Schofield
made out general orders for Crook's guidance, which later
proved to be epochal in nature. These orders completely
shattered the outworn policy of expediency and set forth the
following instructions "for the government of Indians subject to military control in the Territory of Arizona:" (1) all
roving bands were to go upon the reservations at once; (2)
if found away, they were to be punished as hostiles; (3) an
army officer was to act as agent on each reservation; (4) a
descriptive list was to be made of each male old enough to
go upon the warpath, with the number in his family recorded, and a duplicate form was to be on his person at all
times; (5) the presence on the reservation of every male
was to be verified at least once each day; (6) a tribe, unless
guilty of giving aid, was not to be punished for the acts of
indiyiduals; (7) the families of absent warriors were tOe be
held in ~_ustody until captures were effected; (8) the department commander was to fix a time-limit for the inauguration of the new regime; (9) no whites except officials were
to be allowed on the reserves without permission, and official
escorts were to be furnished in all cases; (10) each Indian
was to receive a specific amount of rations, and the issues
were to be supervised by, army officers; (11) vigorous operations were to be continued against the hostiles until they
submitted; (12) incorrigibles were to be hunted down with
the aid of friendly scouts; and (13) full authority was conferred upon the department commander "to adopt such
measures" as might be needed "to give full effect to the policy of the government."48
47. Townsend to Schofield, Nov. 11, 1871, A. G. 0., 3896; Schofield to Townsend, Nov. 21, 1871, ibid., 4156.
48. Gen. Orders no. 10, Nov. 21, 1871, Ibid., 4553. General Sheridan issued
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At Washington, the official attitude fully indicated that
temporizing was ended.. That Colyer had lost the support of
Grant, Sherman, Delano and Belknap, is shown by their
action in promising that Crook would be "warmly supported in rigorous aggressive operations." Delano even ordered Superintendent of Indian Affairs Herman Bendel!
either to cooperate with Crook in the new plan of pacification, or to resign at once. 49
. Arrangements were also made for a general movement
of new troops to the Apache country and congress was asked
for $50,000 to build a military telegraph into Arizona. 5o
But the peace advocates were not to be worsted without a
struggle. In fact, after the Loring massacre, "certain interests" continued to harp upon the matter until they led a
large portion of the eastern public to believe that a party of
frontiersmen had committed the crime to insure a continuance of the war. Some of the military also supported the
peace group, by declaring that the Indians could never be
reclaimed by "following two directly opposite policies at
the· same time-one of war, the other of peace." And the
civilian friends of the tribesmen insisted "that there is no
chance to get up a war with the Apaches as all are on the
Reservation and at Peace." President Felix Brunot of the
board of Indian commissioners boldly wrote that a policy of
"judicious forbearance" should be substituted for General
Schofield's stringent orders which, if continued, were certain to defeat the peaceful designs of the· government. AIwa.ys lukewarm towards a policy of force, the officials of the
department of the interior became positively opposed when
they realized that a consummation of the war plans might
49. McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871;
Delano to Comm., Nov. 8, 1871, 1. 0., I 971.
Herman BendelJ of Albany, New York, was appointed superintendent early in
1871. He took charge in late March. BendelJ to Parker, April 10, 1871, I, 0., Superintendent's Letter Book (hereafter cited as S. L. B.), vol. i, p. 9.
50. 42 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D., no. 14.
almost identical orders to regulate the control of the Western Apaches in New
Mexico. All band~, including those that might "come into New Mexico," were to be
concentrated at the Tulerosa Reservation. Gen. Orders no. 8, Nov. 20, 1871, ibid., 2465.

56

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

result in an intrenchment of'military control. 51 But of the
greatest weight to the peace party were the views soon to be
expressed by the president:
I do not believe our creator ever placed different races of men on this earth with the view of having the stronger exert all thei:r energies on exterminating the weaker. If any change takes place in
the Indian policy of the government while I hold
my present office it will be on the humanitarian
side of the question. 52
The war party, meantime, ·had gone ahead with their
plans for a drastic policy, and Crook in December 1871 sent
word to the bands that they must be on the reservations by
February 15, 1872, if they wished to avoid severe punishment. In compliance hundreds of Indians rushed to the
reserves where, according to reports, they not only avoided
the rigors of winter and the pangs of hunger, but also prepared for hostilities by caching their surplus rations and
increasing their store of munitions. 53 Crook waited patiently
until February 7, and then announced that after the elapse
of nine days no Apache absent from a reserve would be
received except as a prisoner of war. And Schofield, in close
touch with affairs, wired the war department two days
before the deadline that "late" advices from Crook indicated the necessity of an immediate "unavoidable campaign."54
.
War was now at hand on the frontier, but peace had
again triumphed in Washington. In fact, Crook had scarcely
51. Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872; Col. N. M. Dudley to Colyer, Nov. 2, 1871,
R. B. 1. C., 1871, p. 53; C. E. Coa"ley to Colyer, Jan. 30, 1872, 1. 0., C 870; 'Brunot to
Delano, Jan. 27, 1872, A. G. 0., 508; Delano to Francis A. Walker, Jan. 2, 1872, 1. 0.,
(n. f.).

52. Grant to Geo. H. Stuart, Oct. 26, 1872, 1. 0., Scrap Book, B. I. C. In general,
President Grant probably favored a mild policy in Indian relations. The pressure of
strong pro-war economic and political groups was doubtless the cause of his inconsistent views.
53. Gen. Orders no. 32, Dec. 11, 1871, and Gen. Orders no. 35, Dec. 27, 1871, A.
G. 0., 3896; Arizona Citizen, Jan. 27, 1872; Bende]] to Walker, Jan. 30, 1872, 1. 0.,
S. L. 8., vol. i, p. 228.
54. Gen. Orders no. 9, Feb. 7, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Feb. 24, 1872; Schofield
to A. G., Feb. 13, 1872, 1. 0., W 1271.
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moved his commands into the field before the war department, at the· request of Delano, notified Schofield to avoid
hostilities as much as possible. 55 Telegrams of protest
recounting recent outrages 56 accomplished nothing, for the
president, Secretary Delano and Secretary Belknap had conferred again and decided that instead of war, "the Apaches
should be induced by persuasive means, if possible, to return
to their reservations, or better, to go upon some reservation
in New Mexico." But of greater chagrin to the war party
was the intelligence that a new agent of the interior department would soon visit the Indian country "to cooperate with
the military" in preserving peace. 57
The president and Secretary Delano wished to make no
mistake this time, and after much pondering over the choice
of an agent, selected General O. O. Howard, an official of
proved experience in the field of Indian .diplomacy. Delano
instructed him to proceed at once to the Indian country,
where he was to take steps which in his own judgment'
seemed best adapted "to maintain peace and secure the execution of the policy of the government." Fully admonished
to confer and cooperate with the military, the general was·
also directed to persuade as many chiefs "as possible" to'
return with him toWashing1mi for a peace conference. 58
Howard, thus armed with plenary power, hastened west
and entered the Apache country at Fort McDowell. From
55. A. G. to Schofield, Feb. 20, 1872, A. G. 0., 549. Sheridan was similarly instructed.
56. The post herd was stolen at Fort McDowell; eight hundred Indians left Date
Creek, killed two men, attacked two trains and invested the Prescott-Wickenburg
country; and a like number left Camp Verde, although all the women and 'children
remained at the reserve. The bucks then harrassed every mine and ranch in the
region. Crook to A. A. G., Feb. 20, 1872, ibid., 3057; Capt. C. C. C. Carr to A. A. G.,
Feb. 22, 1872, ibid., 1210. See especially Schofield to Townsend, Feb. 26, 1872, ibid., 508.
57. Townsend to Schofield, Feb. 24, 1872, A. G. 0., 2659.
58. Delano to Belknap, Feb. 29, 1872, ibid., 717; Delano to Howard, Feb. 29,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. 1W. 1, vol. 1, pp. 155-159. See o;lso, Special Orders,
no. 53, Mar. 2, 1872, I. D.
Grant showed his personal interest in Howard's mission, by writing Schofield a
letter of placation. Grant to Schofield, Mar. 6, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. ;'0. 1,
vol. i, p. 160: On March 5 the house of representatives had a heated discussion of the
Apache problem. The administration's views were clearly presented. See Congo Globe,
. .
vol. cHi, .pp. 1433-1434.
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this point, after a most harmonious conference with General Crook, he pushed on to Fort Grant only to find upon his
arrival that the one thousand Indians under the care of
Major E. W. Crittenden were ready to flee at a moment's
notice. 59 The new civilian agent,· Edward C. Jacobs, had
just arrived,60 but Howard "deemed the presence of Lieutenant Whitman essential to assist in restoring a change of
confidence with them," and had him temporarily returned
from his point of incarceration at Camp Crittenden. 61 In
a constructive council on April 26, 1872, the Indians not only
demanded the return of their stolen children, but also insisted that Whitman be restored as their agent. More important to future relations, the chiefs suggested that they be
given a new reservation, far removed from the whites, in
some healthier locality. Howard considered their proposal
of extreme importance, and upon leaving for Tucson, promised that he would arrange for the holding of a general conference of Indians; citizens and territorial officials at the
post on May 21. 62
'
The general tarried in Tucson only long enough to
.arrange with Safford for the return of the captive children
held in the town; then he turned north to the Prescott are~.
En route, at Date Creek, he recommended that the nine
hundred poverty stricken savages living near the post be
moved to the Colorado River Reservation as soon as their
crops wereharvested. 63 lJnfortunately, a sharp increase in
59. Howard to Schofield, April 18, 1872, I. 0., A 1352.
60. Jacobs was a nominee of the Dutch Reformed Church, I. O. I 1219.
61. The unrest of the Indians was caused by the recent ~rrest of Agent .Whitman.
The lieutenant, always an object of suspicion to both the citizens and the military,
was arrested and held for court martial on March 12 by order of General Schofield.
He was charged with .not obeying General Orders no. 10. Special Orders no. 17, Mar.
12, 1872, I. 0., W 1463. The Rev. E. P. Smith, who accompanied Howard, reported
that Whitman's downfall was caused by groups who feared his success as agent
would react too favorably for the peace policy. Smith to Walker, April 8, 1872, I. 0.,
S 777. Crook, viewing the matter differently, said one year later: "I told General
Howard that the administration of their affairs under Whitman, Third Cavalry, Was
criminally rotten and neE7ded a thorough investigation but so far from heeding my
suggestion he intensified matters by giving the persons concerned in this rottenness his moral support . . ." .Crook to A. A. G., Ju,ly 3, 1873, A. G. 0., 2933.
62. Howard to Delano, April 27, 1938, I. 0., H 1390.
63. Howard to Delano, May 3, 1872, I. D.; 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I,
vol. i, p. 154.
7
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depredations by Tontos and Indians of the Verde region
endangered the peace policy; yet Howard without hesitation
notified Crook that "amongst the incorrigible hostile there is
no course left but to deal with vigor, according to your discretion."64
General Howard rested in Prescott for a week, and then
accompanied by General Crook and Superintendent Bendell
crossed over the country to Camp Grant, "arriving on May 20.
Since Governor Safford had already arrived with a large
delegation of officials, citizens and Indian' chiefs, the prearranged conference began'the next morning. After three
days of extended speechmaking-figurative and symbolic
on the part of the Indians and paternalistic and designing on
the part' of the whites-a general peace was made among
the various tribes of southern Arizona, 'in which the Apaches
specifically promised to trail thieves and to help Crook ferret
out those individuals among their bands who' remained
incorrigible. 65
Howard complied with the Apache chiefs' demands for
a healthier location, by designating a large area (to be
known as the San Carlos Reservation) co~tiguous to and
directly south of the White Mountain Reservation as a future
home for all the bands collected at Camp Grant. But in the
case of the retention of Whitman as their agent, he persuaded the chiefs that the lieutenant would be required to
join his regiment. 66 Howard now closed the conference, and
64. Howard to Crook, May 9, 1872, A. G. 0., 2100. Before an execution of Gen, eral Orders no. 9 (cf. supra, p. 56) should occur, Howard suggested that every commandant be informed that peace and civilization were the motives of all action to be
taken. Crook immediately ordered his officers to "aid the duly authorized agents of
the government, by every means in their power, in their efforts to civilize and e]~vate
the Indians under their charge." 42 Cong., 3 ,sess, H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 171.
65. The governor located and brought six of the captured children to the conference. The other twenty-one (two others had escaped soon after,their capture) Were
reported to be in Mexico. The council almost broke up into a battle when' Howard,
due to the objections of the district attorney, refused to turn the six over. However,
he restored order by agreeing to hold the children at' the agency until the president
could make a decision. Arizona Citize;', 'May 25, 1872. The president restored the
children a few weeks later. McCormick to Bishop J. B. Salp'ointe, July 31, 1872, in
Arizona Citizen, Sept. 7, 1872.
66. 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p. 172.
Whitman drOPped out of sight after Schofield, at Howard's request; ordered him
to report at di~ision headquarters. ,Special Orders. no. 29, June 8, 1872, A. G. 0., 2386.
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accompanied by seven prominent Indians who had agreed
to journey with him to the East left the Indian country by
way of Camp Apache, where three Coyotero chiefs were
added to the peace delegation. 67
The delegation reached Washington on June 22, 1872,
and during the next three weeks, in conferences with high
officials and in a public appearance at New York, did much
to strengthen the eastern sentiment for peace. 68 But the
administration decided that its policy among the Apaches
would never be successful unless. Cochise were included;
therefore, President Grant directed Howard to return to the
Apache country on a second mission of peace. 69
Howard reached Camp Apache on August 11, only to
find that the Coyoteros were on the verge of an outbreak.
This situation had developed because of the arrest of sev~
eral chiefs, and also because an impasse had arisen between
the department of the interior and the war department over
the issuance of rations. Diplomatically, the general secured
the release of the prisoners; and by replacing the acting
agent, Major A. J. Dallas, with Dr. Milan Soule, the post
surgeon, he insured a continuance of the issues. 7o
67. ·-Howard's complete report of his mission is printed in 42 Cong., 3 sess.,
H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, pp. 148~158. See also a detailed. report of the Camp Grant
council in Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872.
68. R. B. I. C., 1872, p. 27.
69. Grant to A. G., July 3, 1872, .A. G. 0., 2663.
During the spring and summer of 1872, conditions in the Cochise country became

fully as serious as they had been in former years. All the depredations were attributed
to the Chiricahuas. Lt. Stephen O'Connor to A. A. G., June 26, 1872; A. G. 0., 3095;
Arizona Citizen, May 4, 11, June I, 15, 29, July 6, 1872.
70. Dallas to editor, Aug. 11, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 24, 1872; Howard
to Bendell, Aug. 14, 1872, 1. 0., Howard Correspondence. Hereafter ·this file will be
designated H. C.
On June 25 the war department ordered its officers to stop issues to Indians.
Howard's arrival temporarily solved the problem, and later an exception was made
whereby supplies could be furnished. However, the issuing would have to be done
by non-military men. AU the correspondence is given in A. G. 0., 2061, 2612 and
8985.
Most of the trouble was caused by the delay of the officials of the department of
the interior in approving Bendell's beef contracts, for contractors were reluctant to
make deliveries without approved contracts. But anxious for large profits, they
were willing to deliver the same beef at six cents per pound (one cent extra) in
exchange for certified vouchers. Howard made the concession. Gp. cit. Howard had
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Howard now moved eastward to the Tulerosa Reservation, where he hoped to complete arrangements for a conference with Cochise. But again he was forced to postpone
his main mission in order to prevent a collapse of Colyer's
work in New Mexico.H During his visit of eight days 'Yith
the Southern Apaches, the chiefs advanced every possible
argument against Tulerosa as a reserve, and insisted that
their bands be returned to Canada· Alamosa. They also
pressed for a new agent, by pointing out that their blankets
fell to pieces when damp. The general, of course, refused to
accede to their request, but his promise to submit their questions "to the President for his decision" apparently satisfied
them. However, his action in ordering a liberal increase in
their rations was probably the factor that reconciled them. 72
Still unable to communicate with Cochise, Howard secured the services of Thomas J. Jeffords, an unusual frontiersman,73 who was certain that a peace could be made,
provided the general would go to the chief's stronghold in
the Dragoon Mountains of Arizona. The proposal was
accepted, and the party of three whites and two Indian
friends of the Chiricahuas set out at once. 74
71. Out of 1,600 Southern Apaches reported to be at Canada Alamosa ~n March,
1872, only 450 had removed to Tulerosa by September. O. F. Piper to Pope, Aug. 31,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, p. 306.
72. Howard to Pope, Sept. 5, 1872, H. C.; Howard to Walker, Nov. 7, 1872, I.
0., 383.
73. .r effords was a close friend of Cochise. Dr. Henry S. Turrill, the post surgeon at Fort Bayard in 1872, later wrote that .r effords gained and kept the friendship
of Cochise by selling him ammunition. See The New York Society of the Order of the
Founders and Patriots of America. Publication no. 18 (N. Y., 1907), pp. 16-21. Major
W. R. Price claimed he had witnesses who would testify that .r effords had traded
ammunition to the Indians for stock. Price to A. G., Aug. I, 1873, A. G. 0., 3383.
74. Howard compromised himself at this point, by giving two Southern Apache
bandS permission to go to Canada Alamosa instead of Tulerosa. A rancorous correspondence during the next three months, which involved Sherman, Sheridan, Belknap, Delano
and many other officials, vividly portrays the burning animosities that practically
paralyzed all efforts to solve the Apache problem. The correspondence is collected in
1. 0., W 551.
likely erred on his first trip when he advised Bendell to accept bids which would have
allowed different amounts of issues at the respective reserves. This fact would have
caused unrest among the Indians-hence, the delay in approval. A.G. 0., 2612.
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When the, Stein's Peak region was reached, early in
October, smoke signals were set up, and within a few hours
some sixty of Cochise's followers had made their appearance.
The party was then led over deserts and mountains directly
to the chief's famous retreat. The parley started as soon as
the bands could be assembled. Cochise was so anxious for
peace that he even agreed to move to Canada Alamosa, but
his captains would consent only to a reserve in Arizona.
Howard soon realized that there could be no peace among
the Apaches unless the Chiricahuas were included; therefore, when Cochise emphatically agreed' to restore stolen
property and to guarantee the safety of travellers in his
country, the tribe was promised a reserve of their own selection. But of far greater satisfaction to the bands, was the
announcement that Jeffords was to act as their agent. The
next day, October 13, near Fort Bowie, Howard completed
the final details of the conference, by directing the post commander to furnish the tribe rations until the department of
the interior could assume the responsibility; he then left for
Washington to deliver his report. 75
All the Apaches had now been drawn within the scope
of the peace plan, but affairs at the reserves proved that the
problem of control was yet in its infancy. Liberal subsistence at Camp Grant did not stop the raids; moreover, without a daily muster and with a ration issue every tenth day,
the raiders had ample time to cover a great amount of territory and still be back at the' appointed time. In fact, the
increase in marauding and the development of a storm of
criticism, strongly reminiscent of the situation previous to
the Camp Grant massacre, forced Howard, at the start of
the second trip, to replace Agent Jacobs with George H.
Stevens who was popular with both the frontiersmen and
75. Howard to Crook, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Washington Morning Chronicle,
Nov. '10, 1872; Howard to Maj. S. S. Sumner, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Order setting aside
the Chiricahua reservation, Oct. 11, 1872, 1. 0., H 383. The reserve comprised the
sout,heast corner of Arizona.
At the Pima Villages, Howard learned of unsatisfactory conditions which caused
him to abolish the feeding posts at Fort McDowell and Date Creek. Howard to Crook,
Oct. 13, '1872, H. C.; Howard to Bendell, Oct. 17. 1872, Ariz. Misc.
'
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the Indians. And just after his peace with Cochise, the
general, even more alarmed, ordered that the Camp Grant
bands were to be removed to the San Carios Reservation not
later than January i, 1873. 76 The situation failed to improve
under the new agent, but it was not until December, 1872,
that Crook was able to bring about the requirement' of a
daily muster. At the end of the year, Stevens reported affairs
to be in a"hubbub." 'To Bendell's view, however, the trouble
was caused by a "lack of firmness on the part of the agent."77
Conditions at the Verde Reservation were no more favorable than those at Camp Grant. The management of the
Indians collected at the former point proved to be relatively
easy immediately after Colyer's visit, but in December, 1871,
'when Crook inaugurated military contro,l, about five hundred
of the savages 'fled to the mountains. During the next 'few
months so many Of the others left that General Howard gave
no attention to the reserve on either of his trips. In fact,
when Dr. J. W. Williams, an appointee of the Dutch Reformed Church, arrived at the agency in July, 1872, the
absenGe of all but five of the tribesmen caused his transference to Date Creek. 78 Several bands, however, were
anxious for peace, and upon being told by Captain C. C.
Carr, the commandant at Camp Verde, to come in, obey
orders and receive rations, some eighty Yavapai and Tontos surrendered. Many others followed until it appeared
that all would return, but the killing of an important Tonto
prisoner caused every .Indian on the reserve to seek safety
in flight. During August; a considerable number of the
Indians, entirely unwilling to confine themselves to the
reserve, adopted a policy of coming in for rations and then
leaving. Crook solved the problem from the military stand76. Arizona Citizen, May 4, June 22, 29, Sept. 7, 14, 28, 1872; Howard to Bendell,
Aug. 29, 1872, I. 0., Ariz. Misc ... same to same, Oct. 17, 1872, H. C.
77.' Stevens to John Wasson, Nov. 15, Dec. 10, 1872, I. 0., M 127; Crook to
A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. 0., 286; Bendell to Walker, Dec. 5, 1872, S. L. B.,
vol. ii, pp. 2-3.
78. Williams to Walker, July 6, 1872, I. 0., W 91.
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point by ordering their arrest and daily muster ;79 yet in
taking such action he ended all possibilities for a peace
without war.
In contrast to their Verde kinsmen, the 900-1000 Yavapai who had collected at the Date Creek feeding post proved
to be especially cooperative for several months following
Colyer's mission. Submissive to military control from the
first they readily accepted, during July, 1872, the more rigid
discipline introduced by their new civil agent, Dr. Williams;
nevertheless, after more than one hundred hostiles had been
forced in, Williams reported that the troops were "the controlling factor with them."80
The agent improved his authority, however, until an
epidemic of fever, in August, forced him to permit several
hundred sick Indians to retire to the cool highlands. But,
once more in their former haunts, his charges decided
against ever. again submitting to reservationcontroI.81
Crook now came to his relief, and after arresting four of
the Loring massacre participants,82 inaugurated a sharp
campaign against the recalcitrants. This action, which resulted in the slaughter of seventy of their warriors, greatly
humbled the bands' haughty spirit, and by December, 1872,
the reserve was filled with more Indians than ever before. 83
Reservation control now appeared to bea reality among the
Yavapai at Camp Date Creek.
79. Carr to A .A. G., July 8, 1872, A. G. 0., 3188; same to same. Aug. 14, 1872,
ibid., 3573; Bendel! to Walker, Sept. 30, 1872, S. L. B., vol. i, p. 359; Crook to C. 0.,
Camp Verde, Sept. 24, 1872, 1. 0., B 360.
80.' Capt. Philip Dwyer to P. A., July 7, 1872, A. G. 0., 3084; Williams to Bendell, Sept. I, 187~, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i; p. 326.
81. Lt. W. J. Volkmar to A. A. G.. Sept. I, 1872, A. G. 0., 3815; James Grant to
C. 0., Date Creek, Sept. 6, 1872, ibid., 3908.
82. Several of the Date Creek Indians were involved in the crime. But of
greater importance to Crook was the fact that some of them had been reserve Indians
prior to the killing. Long convinced of the necessity of demonstrating to both malcontents and friendlies that none but truly peaceable tribesmen could find safety by
flight to reserves, the general went to the post on September 8, and succeeded, by a
clever stratagem, in making the arrests. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1872, A. G. 0.,
4091; Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872.
83. Crook to A. A. Goo Dec. 13, 1872, 1. 0., W 721; Capt. Julius Mason to A. A.
G., Oct. 27, 1872, A. G. 0., 4706; Williams to Bendel!, Dec. 23, 1872, 1. I., Ariz. Misc.
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Far to the east of the Date Creek Indians, the Coyotero bands of the White Mountains readily accepted reservation control as initiated by Colyer. Their favorable and
friendly attitude was doubtless due to the fact that their prescribed reservation necessitated no radical changes in their
habitat or mode of life; moreover, the advantage of receiving regular issues of rations made their life easier and less
precarious. Some difficulties arose during the first year
over the matter of subsistence, but officials felt that the
appointment of Dr. Soule would end all serious embarrassments. 84 And their views proved correct, for both Soule
and Bendell, by open market purchases and by advance
acceptance of beef deliveries, insured themselves against
any catastrophic exigencies. 85 The Indians, in addition to
behaving well, worked very energetically during the growing season of 1872, and at harvest time they sold more than
80,000 pounds of corn and fodder. At peace among themselves and .satisfied with their new regime, the only dangers
that threatened the Coyoteros near the end of the year were
those that might'arise in connection with Crook's impending
campaign. 80
Crook, of course, never warred against peaceable Indians, but in' planning aggressive action he invariably
eliminated all factors that might lead to abortive results.
Therefore, with the aim of not only protecting the Coyoteros,
but also of preventing the less docile bucks from joining
neighboring hostile groups, he directed on November 5, 1872,
that after ten days all Indians of both sexes were to concentrate within one mile of Camp Apache and submit to a daily
muster; also, that if any individual should fail to conform
84. Cf. BUpra. p. 60.
85. Soule to BendeII, Sept. 12, 1872, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Bendell to Howard, Sept.
17. 1872. S. L. B., vol. i, pp. 317·318.
Soule accepted a six months supply of beef (700,000 lbs.) on October 10.
Soule to BendeII, Oct. 10. 1872, 1. 0., B' 567. No explanation was offered two months
later when he informed BendeIl that a further supply of cattle would be required from
New Mexico to meet the Indian needs. Soule to BendelI, Dec. 21. 1872. 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.
It is possible the contractor herded most of the supply in New Mexico.
86. Cf. infra, p. 69.
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after a reasonable time, he was not to be received except as
. a prisoner of war. 87
This drastic order, by ignoring Howard's promise to
the Indians of safety anywhere on the reservation,88 left the
bands exposed to summary punishment even though they
actually remained within the legal boundaries. It also left
them under exclusive military control except in the case of
issues. So naturally they became quite disturbed when
Major W. H. Brown arrived a few days later to enlist scouts
and personally enforce the order. They were unwilling to
leave their homes where some of their crops remained unharvested and where their stock would stray and become prey
to wild beasts. Besides, they were reluctant to enlist in
scout companies that might later be forced to fight against
their own bands. 89 The test tried them severely, but they
conformed with cheerfulness and cooperativeness.. As a
result, they were soon permitted to stay as far as ten miles
from the post.90
.
the
general
improvement that resulted from
Despite
Colyer's and Howard's efforts, the continuance of devastations and killings' proved that the peace policy per se was
insufficient as a method of Apache control.· Attacks were
numerous in both northern and southern Arizona during the
summer months of 1872, and conditions in the Prescott area
again resembled those that followed the Civil War. 91 Once
again the situation played into the hands of the advocates
of war, and naturally it strengthened the views of those
87.
88.

5, 1872.

462.

A. A. G. to G. 0., Fort Apache, Nov.
1. 0., B
Howard probably anticipated Crook's action, for he had already recommended
that the Department of Arizona be modified so that the White Mountain and Chiricahua reservations should be included in the District of New Mexico. Howard to Walker,
Nov.
1. 0., H
Grant, Belknap and Delano favored the change, but
deferred to Sherman who refused to give his approval when he found that Pope and
Crook were strongly opposed to the plan. Delano to Belknap, Dec.
A. G .0.,
Sherman to Belknap, Jan.
1. 0., W
Pedro to Howard, Nov.
I. 0., H
Miguel to Howard, Nov.
1872, ibid. C. E. Cooley wrote for the chiefs.
Bendell to ·Walker, Dec.
S. L. B., vol. ii, p.
Crook to A. A. G., May
A: G. 0.,
Arizona Miner, June
1872; Arizona Citizen, June
Aug.

7, 1872,

5055;
89.
90.
91.

383.

8, 1872,
18, 1872,

31, 1872,
28, 1872,
29,
31, 1872.

10, 1872,

721.
532;

2388;

19.

33.

29,
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persons who had always thought that the Apaches would
. have to be beaten into submission. 92
Crook believed from the time he first entered the territory that the Apaches would have to be reduced by war, but
with. great prudence he avoided all steps that might interfere with the success of the peace policy or cause an affront
to public opinion. 93 Sheridan entertained a similar view and
insisted that the government would be forced by public sentiment to "render every portion of our extensive frontier
safe for a citizen to travel over or occupy." He also said that
a policy was an erroneous one that taught the Indian what
was right, but failed to teach him that which was wrong.
Even the Washington officialdom, keenly alive to public
opinion, turned to a policy of war. 94
Crook, thus supported, now determined to press his
views with vigor. On 'September 21, 1872,.he informed the
war department that the Apaches on the reservations were
guilty of many of the murders and devastations that occurred
during the summer, and to. substantiate his incrimination,
sent in a long list of outrages which he branded as "a
ghastly commentary upon the result." Assured that humanity at last demanded the punishment of the "incorrigibily
--- - --- --.hostile," he requested the full cooperation of the civil agents
as compensation for his aid to their cause. 95
Superior officers approved his views. General Schofield announced on October 15, that "no course is open except
a vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war, until
they are completely subdued, and the Department Com92. New York Hera.ld, Sept. 10, 1872.
93. Journal of Military Service Institution, vol. vii, p. 264. See Crook's saga..
cious remarks on the Apaches in his annual report for 1872. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E.
D., no. I, vol. ii, pp. 77-78.
94. Sheridan to A. G., Oct. 12, 1872, 42 Cong.,3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 35; Walker to Delano, Nov. 1, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. i, P. 59.
Walker said in 1874 that Crook's operations were not of the 'nature of war, but of
discipline. F. A. Walker, The Indian Question (Boston, 1874), p. 45.
95. Crook to A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. I, vol. ii, P. 79.
His list included forty-four killed and sixteen wounded.
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mander should have ample power of restriction over reservation Indians."96
Crook was fully prepared to make war, having used his
long periods of forced inaction in arranging every detail of
organization for the proper management of the impending
campaign. He planned his campaign in such a way that the
final crushing blows would be struck in the very center of
the hostile country-the Tonto Basin.. To accomplish this
end, preliminary campaigns were to be waged in regions
appendant to the main Indian country. These operations, he
felt, would greatly reduce the warring groups and result in
their final concentration in the basin proper. Then he
planned for several strong, swiftly-moving columns to converge upon them from various points along. the rim of the
basin. Crook,on his own part, intended to help organize the
columns and, with the campaign ·once under way, to move
from point to point along the whole periphery of the battle
area, exercising general supervision of movements,hut leaving the details of fighting to the respective officers. With the
idea of carrying war to the savages at a time when winter
weather would most handicap them, November 15 was designated for the start of the preliminary movements. 97
Promptly, three separate commands of one company of
cavalry and a detachment of forty Indian scouts each, left
Camp Hualpai to scout through to Camp Verde by way of
the San Francisco peaks and upper V:erde country. The
movement was unusually successful, and during the fifteen
days required to reach the post, the commands destroyed,
numerous winter rancherias, killed thirteen warriors and
captured several squaws. Meantime, Captain George F.
Price, at Date Creek, sent out two expeditions with instructions to clear the country of Indians on the west side of the
Verde as far down as Fort McDowell. Cooperating with him
96. Schofield to A. G., Oct. 18, 1872, A. G. 0., 4316.
97. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. 0., 5312; Jour:..m of Military Service
11l8titutimt, vol. vii, pp. 262-264; E; G. Cattermole, Famous Frontiersmen, Pioneers
and Scouts (Chicago, 1883), p. 535.
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were two other commands sent from Camp Verde to scout
the Red Rock and Black Hills country. Price's commands
found many Indians scattered about between Date Creek
and Camp Verde, but they failed to effect any decisive actions. In contrast, the two associated commands killed thirteen warriors, captured three others and pushed many hostile bands eastward into the Tonto region. 98
Crook was even more active than his subordinates.
First at Camp Verde he completed his plans and then at
Camp Apache he began the enlistment of extra scout companies. The Coyotero bands, near the latter post, were quite
"feverish," but his "requirements were met with alacrity."
Although Crook noted some discrepancies in agency administration, time was too limited for investigation, and after
organizing one expedition to be commanded by Captain
George M. Randall, he pushed on to Camp Grant. Here he
completed arrangements for the organization of threeadditional expeditions, one of which was to take the field from
Camp McDowelI.99
The final campaign now arranged for, the nine columns
speedily penetrated into the haunts of the hostiles. Because
of the hazardous terrain over which the troops were forced
to operate, and also because of the decentralized nature of
Apache society, the fighting naturally developed into an innumerable number of small engagements. The columns from
Camp Grant, commanded by Captain W. H. Brown, did
some of the most effective and spectacular fighting of the
whole campaign, especially at the battle of the caves on Salt
River, where seventy-six Indians were killed and eighteen
others captured. 10o
Crook's other commands, although not so spectacular,
did equally effective work. During the three months fol98. Capt. A. H. Nickerson to A. A. G.• Dec. 26, 1872, A. G. 0., 172.
99. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, op. cit.; Bourke, On the Border with
Crook, pp. 177-182.
.
100. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873,' I. 0., 355. This communication is Crook's
annual report for 1873. It arrived too late to be printed. See also Nickerson to A. A.
G., Jan. 11, 1873; A. G. 0., 213; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 20, 1873; Lockwood, The
Apache Indians, pp. 196-199.
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lowing the start of the campaign, they harried and decimated the hostile bands almost continuously. No accurate
figures are available, but it is probable that nearly three
hundred warriors were killed or received mortal wounds.
In addition, a considerable number of noncombatants suffered a like fate, and occasionally some warriors were taken
captive. All indications showed, at the end of February,
1873, that a few more punitive blows would result in a general surrender. 101
Punishment was not long deferred. About the middle
of March, some five hundred savages, who had evidently
taken refuge in the region between the Gila and the Colorado, began to hanT the Wickenburg country. Most of them
were thought to be on the verge of surrender, but one party
murdered three important citizens of the town itself. This
outrage resulted in a new offensive on the part of the troops,
and within a short time eighty warriors were killed and
thirty squaws captured. Such losses completely broke most
of the hostiles ;;; consequently, they fairly precipitated themselves to the reservations. 102 A sizeable group, however, fled
into the Tonto Basin, only to lose sixty-six warriors at the
hands of Major Randall's column. The major then pushed
relentlessly after the survivors, and a few days later succeeded in capturing the entire group of one hundred and
thirty-six souls on Turret Mountain, west of the Verde
River. 103
By the first of April, great numbers of Indians, earnestly
begging for peace, had collected near Camp Verde. General
Crook was also ready for peace, fearing that further slaughter might arouse other peace efforts in the East. He therefore went to the post, and "being satisfied that their professions were sincere," concluded a general peace by which the
101. Henden to Walker, Dec. 31, 1872, op. cit.; J. F. May to Howard, Jan. 27,
1873, 1. 0., H 836; Arizona Citizen, Mar; 1, 1873.
102. Henden to Comm., April I, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 195; Arizona Miner, Mar.
15, 1873; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, 1873.
103. J. E. Roberts to Henden, April 29, 1873, 1. 0., Ariz. Misc.; Arizona Citizen,
April 12, 1873.
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bands agreed to stop all violence, to remain strictly upon
their reservations and to comply with all regulations of their
authorized agents. In turn, as long as they remained true
to the treaty terms, Crook promised to be responsible Jor
their protection. It was also agreed that after sufficient time
had elapsed to enable all renegades and straggling parties to
reach the reservation, the military was to pursue and force
them in, destroying all who refused to surrender. 104
104. General Orders no. 12, April 7, 1873. Army War College; Crook to A. A. G.,
April 12, 1873, A. G. 0., 1882.
On April 9, Crook complimented his troops as entitled "to a reputation second
to none in the annals of Indian warfare," and as having "finally closed an Indian war
that has been waged since the days of Cortez." General Orders no 14, April 9,
1872, Army War College.

(To be continued)

NEW MEXICO EDITORIAL OPINION ON SUPREME
COURT REFORM
By FRANK D. REEVE
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT launched his program for
· HEN
W
the reform of the Supreme Court in February, 1937, a
conflict broke out in the halls of congress that left its scar on

\\

the Democratic party and that might have ended in setting
the precedent for a serious modification of our governmental
structure. It was said that a large majority of the newspapers of the country opposed the presidential plan. However that may be, it is true that a substantial part of the
press in New Mexico was in opposition. Among thirty-two
newspapers studied, seventeen or 53 per cent opposed the
change with varying degrees of earnestness, ten or 31 per
cent were non-committal, and five or 16 per cent favored it.
Eighteen of these newspapers favored the Republican party
in the campaign of 1936, eleven were Democratic, and three
were non-committal. Four of the Democratic papers opposed the court change, four favored it, and three were noncommittaL Thirteen of the Republican papers opposed the
change in the court, one favored it, and four were noncommittal.
The Albuquerque Tribune led the discussion with the
feeling that the president had not struck at the root of the
supposed evil. Instead of lessening the power of judicial
review he had remained content with changing the personnel
of the court and, as a result, he might expect the plan to be
attacked, "and justifiably so, even by friends of the New
DeaL" And it soon. decided that "the plan was just too
clever-too damned clever." The idea of restoring a better
balance of power between the judiciary and executive was
sound, but it was a mistake to swing the pendulum too far
back in favor of the executive. 1 The Roswell Daily Record
1.

February 6, 8 (a Scripps-Howard newspaper).
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saw in the plan "an attempt to set aside the protection
afforded by the Constitution and force upon the nation the
views that he [Roosevelt] and other new dealers hold."
Merely forcing new deal views on the country might not be
so bad, but the Record soon feared something more serious:
"the Roosevelt administration is seeking to change the entire
form of the American government."2
This serious charge appeared in many newspapers in
various wordings. The Albuquerque Journal might favor
"new blood" on the court, "but in reforming the judiciary,
Congress needs to assure that there are safeguards which
will prevent any executive now or later from being in a
position to. acquire dictatorial control over the judiciary."3
And the Santa Fe New Mexican saw "perhaps the most insidious attack ever made by a President of the United·
.States." If it were successful, "we shall have just as real a
dictatorship as that of Hitler, Stalin or Mussolini."4 The
Artesia Advocate pointed out that the "concentration of
power is a temptation to any individual that the founders o,f
this government intended to remove." The Magdalena News
thought that the "whole move is, a dictatorial grasp of
power," and concluded that those who made the charge of
attempted dictatorship in the campaign of 1936 "must have
known what they were talking about." The Union County
Leader considered the move primarily "one of political expediency," designed to "eliminate the 'brake' provided by the
constitution." This paper had been very impatient with the
court, but "President Roosevelt has chosen the wrong way;
the right way is by amending the constitution."5 The "pea.nut politicians," according to The Roy Record, might enact
the proposal into law, but pointed out that "there may be a
constitution-loving public to be reckoned with later on." On
the same day The Deming Headlight was willing to "trail
along with the vast majority of ordinary citizens who see in
2.
3.
4.
5.

February
February
February
February

6, 8. .
7.
8, 9.
11.
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the proposal so much danger to our governmental structure
as to make it highly undesirable."6
In the second week of the controversy The Albuquerque
Tribune began to "wonder what might happen to 'certain
inalienable rights' under a precedent, established now because of a benign purpose, if employed by some future leadership of purpose not benign but vicious." And the Roswell
Daily Record boiled the question down to a choice between
"an independent federal judiciary" or "its subserviency to
the chief executive." 7 However, not all the editors in New
Mexico were worrying about the federal judiciary. The
Evening News-Journal (Clovis) thought tpat "the life of
the average man is apt to be affected much more by what
happens in the precincts of the run-of-mine state and county
courts."8 But six days later it believed that "in the face of
what is going on in the rest of the world, it would appear
that nervousness is justified and caution wise;" hence, the
proposal should be studied on its merits. Meanwhile, The
Fort Sumner Leader had "seen so many remarkably good
things inaugurated under the New Deal and carried to completion that we have faith in most anything proposed by the
Administration." This faith was probably not held by everybody. The Deming Headlight reported that "In something
over 100 interviews during the past week we found but two
. people who are in favor with the plan." Among the people
consulted, 80 per cent were Democrats. 9
During the third week of discussion the opposition was
still pronounced, but some slight support did appear for the
plan. The Union County Leader believed that "The president should not attempt to railroad through legislation as
important as this is without submitting the proposal to a
vote of the people." And The Herald (Hot Springs) thought
that "he [Roosevelt] is taking us for a ride that will only
end in a military dictatorship. . . ." The Aztec Independent6.
7.

8.
9.

February 12.
February
February
February 19.

16, 18.
18.
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Review defined freedom simply as "access to a free and im~
partial court to decide the rights of the individual and the
rights of government." The Mountainair Independent reasoned, however,. that congress .has the right to increase the
membership of the court; -therefore, such legislation does
not strike at the foundation of the government and does not
prove that the president wanted to become a dictator. But
it reserved the right to examine more closely the wisdom of
the proposal. This favorable sentiment was supported on
grounds much broader than constitutional law when El Defensor del Pueblo introduced the law of nature: "Si, como
es bien sabido, que se hace necesario este programa para 10
que se trata es de restituir la nacion y conservar la subsistencia de todos . . . las agrupaciones en general, y siendo la
propia conservacion la primera ley de la naturaleza, se
desprende que el presid~nte esta obrando en obediencia de
esa ley redentora."lo
Two weeks later The Mountainair Independent stated
that, "As we see it, the Supreme Court, through its interpretations of the law and the Constitution, looking always to
the past for guidance and precedence in such interpretations, has allocated unto itself powers which ,make it no
longer an equal and coordinate branch of the government,
but instead allow it to transcend and completely override the
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government, so
that neither the Court nor the other branches of the Government are any longer amenable to the wishes of the
people." Therefore, it is not criminal to suggest a change,u
This sentiment found support in the columns of The Silver
City Enterprise which did "not subscribe to the idea that the
addition of six new members to the supreme court would
nullify the Constitution, nor would it be packed with 'spineless puppets'." New judges would interpret the law with the
"view toward -strengthening the Constitution rather than
to nullify or destroy it." But the Santa Fe New Mexican saw
10.
11.

February 24, 25. 26.
March 11.
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in the plan an "admission of fear of a popular vote. All the
executive can do is to maintain the ridiculous claim that the
people already have endorsed his plan."12
The silence of some newspapers during this controversy might be attributed to the state of mind that The Fort
Sumner Leader found itself in: "We have an idea that
[after] all the bunk explanations we've read pro and con the
supreme court situation appeared about as muddled to other
people as to the writer."13 The Evening News-Journal, if
not muddled, was still thinking that it was "probably far
more important that we do something. effective about our
local governments. . . ." And The Daily Current-Argus.
(Carlsbad) "had not taken sides editorially in the issue
because, frankly, we were not sufficiently informed to draw
definite conclusions."14
M~anwhile, The Albuquerque Journal was favoring a
constitutional amendment as "the safer, the American and
Democratic method." The Magdalena News was claiming
that "It is becoming increasingly plain to all thinking men
that this country is being governed by a madman; a fanatic;
a visionary embryo dictator, . . . never apparently satisfied
until the power of life and death of every citizen is placed
in his hands." And the Farmington Times Hustler thought
that "the supreme court argument is well into its silly stages,
with a justice discarding his robes of judicial dignity to
make political remarks at a public meeting. . . . That boner
sort of evens things up with one the president pulled when
he condemned the advanced old age of the justices as undesirable to his policies, only to be reminded that the oldest
justice of the nine was the most liberal of the lot." The proposal of Senator Hatch toretire one justice each year found
favor with the Evening News-Journal. 15
The month of April was marked by a decrease in editorials, but a continuation of disagreement about the court
12. March 12.
13.. March 12.
14.

15.

March 18, 30.
March

24, 25, 26, 27.
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reform plan. The Lovington Leader believed that the "court
will never command the respect it should have when it is presided over by men whose active lives are already passed."
But The Herald thought that "The presidential veto should
be abolished."! The Roy Record favored the Hatch compromise. And The Daily Current-Argus suggested that an
amendment limiting the term of supreme court justices to
ten years was a feasible plan. 16
In May, The Herald still believed that the president "is
fully determined to make himself the Mussolini ·of America. . . ." A month later the Evening News-JQurnal and
The Gallup Independent concurred in the opinion that "The
instipct for democracy as against personal rule is all-powerful in this country. The people's distrust of power concentrated in one pair of hands is ineradicable, and the man who
gets such power in his hands, or even seems about to get it,
is riding for a certain fall."17
When Senator. Robinson died in July, The Albuquerque
Journal and the Evening N ews-Journal thought "It would
be most fortunate for the nation if the fight for the court bill
would be abandoned." And The Mountainair Independent
finally decided that the presidential plan "was a political .
error."18
The storm that arose in the newspapers of New Mexico
around the proposal of President Roosevelt to materially
alter the distribution of power within the federal government, rose to a peak in March and then subsided rapidly.
The verdict of the editors was largely unfavorable. It is
reasonable to conclude that any proposal to change the
structure or powers of government by a method that is contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the constitution will
meet with an unfavorable reception in the same group. And
if editorial opinion is a reflection of public opinion, the same
might be said of the people in general. At any rate, despite
16.
17.
18.

31, April 2. 22.
19.
22, 28.
15, 16. 22.

April 2, March
May
June
July
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the criticism that can be made of the system of checks and
balances in the American government, it still retains its hold
on the minds of many of those who count in the body politic,
even at the expense of their party loyalty.

BOOK REVIEWS

Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, The Journey and Route of the
First European to Cross the Continent of North America, 1534-36. By Clive Hallenbeck. (The A. H. Clark
Company, Glendale, Calif., 1939; 330 pp. $6.00.)
This volume is divided into three parts. First is a paraphrase of the Naujragios of Alvar Nunez, with occasional
reference to the Joint Report of Cabeza de Vaca and his companions. The paraphrase is based largely on the Bandelier
translation of Naufragios, but also utilizes Buckingham
Smith's version. It is largely free from subjective interpretations on the part of the paraphraser, and makes interesting and comprehensive reading.
Part II traces Nunez' route from the Texas coast to
Culiacan in Sinaloa. As in Part I, the N aufragios is the
primary source employed, the Joint Report secondary.
Hallenbeck routes de Vaca farther north than have previous students. He identifies Malhado Island as modern Galveston Island. "From Galveston Island he traces the path of
the Spaniards to the Colorado River, thence northward to
Austin, and to the Tuna Thickets near San Antonio, Texas.
, From San Antonio the route runs northward and slightly
westward to Big Spring, Texas, and from there westward to
the Pecos River at the mouth of Toyah Creek. From there
he takes them northward along the Pecos to near Carlsbad,
New Mexico. A few miles above Carlsbad he turns them
northwest up the Rio Penasco and Elk Creek, then across the
mountains to the Rio Tularosa; from the Tularosa southward along the western edge of the Sacramento Mts. and the
eastern edge of the Huecos. Near the southern tip of the
Hueco Mts., Hallenbeck swings the Spaniards west to the
Rio Grande near EI Paso, then north by east along that
stream to the Rincon ford. Above the ford the route again
turns westward up Barrenda Creek and across the divide to
the Rio Gila, thence southward to San Bernardino in Sonora.
79
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The route ,from San Bernardino to Culiacan, down the Rio
which the party was actually taken by Indians as indicated
in the account, rather than a mere haphazzard routing. Unfortunately he does not make clear just how he determined
most of the postulated Indian trails, either in text or bibliography. After several years of archaeologic and ethno~
historic resea~ch in most of the area considered, and with an
intimate knowledge of the geography, the reviewer seriously
doubts the possibility of objectively determining most of the·
so-called '.'Indian trails." In spite of this objection, the route
seems to have been worked out with the greatest of care, and
the reviewer is not able to suggest other than minute
changes.
'
Part III is a critical consideration of previous tracings
of the de Vaca route by Bandelier, Bancroft, Ponton and
McFarland, Baskett, Read, Twitchell, and Davenport and
Wells. Hallenbeck's criticisms of these routings seem for
the most part to be well taken, though occasionally he falls
into the pitfall of overly and mistakenly discounting the logic
and data of previous students in favor of his own interpretations. Such an instance is found on page 306. Here the
author states that the Spaniards would not have used, the
"Salt Trail" from the Pecos River to the Rio Conchos in
Mexico, since said trail was first laid out by white pioneers,
and was practically waterless throughout. Actually this
route was an ancient one as indicated by archaeological
remains. The J umanos guided Juan Dominguez de Mendoza along it in 1684. Later a Chihuahua trail followed
it, and today it is employed by the Orient branch of the Santa
Fe Railway. Even in the dry season it was well watered,
with the exception of one day's journey, and it is topographically the line of least resistance.
A few other criticisms may be chosen from a group of
possible ones, none of which greatly affect ~he tracing of the
route. On page 189 the northern limit of Pinus cembroides
is given as latitude 26 0 30'. Sperry (Alpine, 1938) lists
cembroides as the common pine of the Chisos Mts. (29 0 20')

ERRATA: P. 80, following line one, insert:
Sonora and southeastward across the Rios Yaqui, Alaye, and
Fuerte, is that previously traced by Dr. Carl Sauer.
The author's justification for this hew tracing of de
Vaca's route; is that he has employed Indian trails, along
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in his check list of Chisos plants. On page 213 the author
states that no trail from east or north strikes the Rio Grande
near the junction of the Conchos (La Junta). Actually, as
indicated previously the important "Salt Trail" joins the
Rio Grande about seven miles below La Junta.
Furthermore, he states that the Rio· Grande does not
flow between mountains anywhere near the mouth of the
Conchos. Certainly, a subjective definition of what is
meant by a "river flowing between mountains" is involved.
Both above and below La Junta the Rio Grande flows directly
between mountains and it was the distinct impression of the
reviewer, during several months of field work at La Junta,
that the Rio Grande flows between mountains there also
(the Chinatis and the Sierras Santa Cruz and Ricos). .In
fact, he is amazed that any other interpretation could exist.
At this point, however, the reviewer is able to add
archaeologic support to Hallenbeck's arguments. Archaeologic work at La Junta has established continuous occupation of that region over at least the last 600 years by potterymaking groups. The Indians mentioned by Nunez, whom
previous workers have located at La Junta, were described
as having no pots, but instead to have used baskets for
cooking. This group, lacking pottery, cannot be identified,
therefore, with the La Junta Indians, and as a consequence
Nunez was not at La Junta.
Many readers also will remain unconvinced by Hallenbeck's nonchalant disposal of sections of the account which
do not fit with his own interpretations as "retrospections"
or "premature references" on the part of Nunez. Two excessive and inconveniently located rivers are thus casually'
disposed of (pp. 192-198).
On the whole, criticism notwithstanding, the book is
carefully written, and thoroughly scientific. It is an outstanding piece of research and is whole-heartedly indorsed
by the reviewer, who plans to modify many of his own ideas
because of it.
J. CHARLES KELLEY
Sul Ross College, Alpine, Texas
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Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936, 1- (VII). Edited
by the Rev. Paul J. Foik, chm. Texas Knights of Columbus historical commission. Vol. IV: The passing of the
missions, 1762-1782. (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones,.
1939; 409 pp.) By Charles E. Castaneda.
In previous issues,1 the attention of our readers has
been called to the initial volumes in this series. Their relation to the fourth, here reviewed, is indicated by their subtitles and inclusive dates: The finding of Texas (15191693); The winning of Texas (1693-1731); and The missions at work (1731-1761).
Apparently the author regards the present volume as
the concluding one in the portrayal of "The Mission Era."
In his opening chapter, a very excellent portrayal of "The
province of Texas in 1762," Dr. Castaneda says (p. 2):
"Like other frontier institutions, the missions were to continue until their work was done. Not till then were they to
pass on even as the frontier itself. It is this last phase that
will form the major portion of the present volume." And
his concluding chapter treats of the "Beginning of secularization" in 1781-82. The seven intervening chapters record
various shiftings, readjustments, and withdrawals' which
characterized the last decades of Spanish rule in a meagerly
occupied, struggling, frontier province.
It is unique, in fact startling, to be told (p. 344) that the
missions in Texas "had done their work and had accomplished their purpose. They were ready to pass on." This
was not true historically in New Mexico, in Pimeria, nor in
California; was it true in Texas? The author's interpretation of this stage of "the mission era" strikes one as somewhat polemical; if we accept at face value the above statement, all the missions in Texas were ready to become selfsupporting parishes and the missionaries would move on to
evangelize other Texan tribes-whereas the voluminous
records here given us show that this period was, on the
whole, one of decadence rather than of fruition. In fact as
1.

New Mexico Historical Review, xi, 352-355; xiii, 331-333.
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the author himself points out (p. 262), even the four missions in San Antonio and the two in San Juan Bautista were
not regarded in 17.72 as ready for secularization.
We are coming gradually to recognize that the mission
was the most effective colonizing agency employed by the
Spanish crown, and that this was true chiefly because of two
.factors: the' uniformly consecrated service of the missionaries and the governmental subsidizing of their work. But
when financial support was not sufficient for the development and expansion of such work, and when the supply of
missionary recruits became inadequate (p. 262), the inevitable result would be to "pass out" rather than to "pass on."
The presidio and the civilian colony were other colonizing
agencies; those in Texas contrasted very unfavorably with
the missions as seen in the fine survey given by Dr. Castaneda in his opening chapter.
Throughout the book we are curious at the complete lack
of any reference by the author to the work of one of his colleagues. Based in large part on the same sources used by
Castaneda in his volumes, Dr. Walter P. Webb in his book
The Great Plains (1931) devoted a chapter to "The Spanish
approach to the Great Plains." It is a very illuminating analysis, especially of Texan history, for the reader who wants
to recover his historical balance and perspective after reading Castaneda. Because of the abundant use of historical
sources, we are apt to forget that the controlling theme of
Dr. Castaneda and his sponsors is "Our Catholic Heritage."
The reviewer has had to remind himself repeatedly that
. whenever the author mentions "Texas" he means Texas with
boundaries as adjusted in 1850. Of course, this enhances the
possible claims as to "Catholic heritage," but it sacrifices
historical accura~y. We have noted previously (vol. xi, p.
353) the error of identifying the Rio Grande with the Rio de
las Palmas; last winter in Sevilla we photographed a letter
of 23 February 1588 from Viceroy Velasco to the very Rev.
Fray Andres de Holmos in Tampico regarding certain native
towns to the north of that place. A messenger had informed
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him (the viceroy) that "he believes that these pueblos are
be'tween the Rio de Palmas and the Rio Grande," and below
in the letter Velasco desires the father to try to ascertain
"what country and people there is between the Rio de Palmas
and the Rio Bravo, and whether they have caciques and principales . . ." (Italics ours.) This should relieve Texas from,
among other things, the dubious honor of listing Nuno de
Guzman among her first governors!
. Nor indeed at any time was any part of the entire Rio
Grande valley included in Texas prior to the boundary claims
asserted by the Texan congress in 1836. . Would it not be
more accurate historically-and more dramatic-to depict
more clearly the account of Texan origin and expansion?
.Apparently Dr. Castaneda attaches no significance to his
casual mention (p. 224) of San Saba as "founded on the'
border of Texas arid New Mexico," and of Carrizal as "in
the jurisdiction of New Mexico."(p. 226) He wishes (p.
44) to include in Texas the presidio and missions of the "El
Paso district" although he recognizes (p. 226) that they
were all on the right bank of the river; he ignores the fact
that there was no "EI Paso" in the modern sense until after
the Mexican War, and the further fact that that whole district-and also the missions at La Junta de los Rios (p. 44)
-belonged to the province of New Mexico throughout Spanish times. (ct. vol. iii, pp. 211-212). And his enthusiasm
carries him too far when he avers (p. 44) that if the English
and. French had reached the Rio Grande and New Mexico the
natives "would never have known the comforts of religion."
Nor was the attack on the presidio and mission of San Saba
"unparalleled . . . in the annals of Spanish colonization"
(p. 99) --:-we need cite only the experience of Santa Fe il1
1680.
The above observations suffice to show that, in relation
to Southwestern history, this volume needs to be taken with
some care; but the reader who bears in mind that the point
of view is ecclesiastical and Texan, will, at the same time, go
far with Dr. Castaneda in 'cordial recognition of what the

BOOK REViEWS

85

Franciscan missionaries contributed to Texan history. He
will welcome the growing mass of source material which the
author is making available and will watch with interest for
successive volumes.
Very few typographical slips have been noticed; the
indexing might have been better.
L. B. B.

Epistolario de la Nueva Espana, 1508-1818. Compiled by
Francisco del Paso y Troncoso. (Biblioteca Historica
Mexicana de obras Ineditas. Segunda Serie. Mexico,
Jose Porrua e hijos.)
The Libreria Robredo of Mexico City in recent years
has been publishing some valuable historical works. It has
now undertaken the publication of the Epistolario de Nueva
Espana, assembled by Don Francisco del Paso y Troncoso in
the archives of Spain and other countries in Europe during
his sojourn abroad between 1892 and 1916, the year of his
death. This Epistolario will comprise fifteen volumes, with
a general index at the end. It is planned to complete the
publication of the series by 1940.
The work is not a collection of letters, as the title
implies. It is true that the greatest bulk of the materials
included consists of letters, but 'there are also numerous
cedulas, ordinances, reports, etc. In Vol. I (yrs. 1505-1529)
there are seventy-eight documents, some from Diego Colon,
Cortes, NUllo de Guzman and others. Six volumes (yrs.
1505-1552) have appeared to date containing 362 documents,
although in a few cases only the titles are given as the text
of the documents has already appeared elsewhere.
Volume IV (yrs. 1540-1546) is of particular interest
for the history of New Mexico, as it includes several documents referring to Vazquez de Coronado. The first document listed in the volume is the report drawn by Viceroy
Mendoza about the people who accompanied Coronado. The
document itself is not published, as it had already been
brought out by Pacheco y Cardenas in their Documentos
ineditos para la historia de America, Vol. XIV, p. 375. Docu-
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ment No. 200 is a letter from Perarmlldez, dated July 28,
1541, telling of the revolt in New Galicia, the death of Pedro
de Alvarado, and that the viceroy had received news from
Coronado ten days before, but would not divulge them. This
must allude to the letter sent by Coronado from Culiacan on
August 3, 1540, informing the viceroy of the progress of the
expedition. We have no other letter from him between this
date and July of 1541.
No letters by Coronado himself appear in this Epistolario. There is one (document No. 238), however, by Licenciado Tejada, quite illuminating in regard to Coronado's
life after his return from his famous expedition to New
Mexico. Licenciado Tejada had been entrusted with the
task of conducting Coronado's residencia~ In this letter of
March 11, 1545, Tejada tells Charles V that he has held
Coronado's residencia and has sentenced him to a fine of
600 pesos de minas. Coronado appealed this sentence, so
the licenciado is sending the documents to Spain. He found
no charges against Cristobal de Onate; on the contrary he
uses this occasion to praise him for his services. This
Cristobal was the father of Don Juan de Onate, the founder
of New Mexico.
In regard to Coronado's condition, the licenciate states
he is not in his right mind; that he is more to be governed
than to let him govern others. He is a very different man
from what he was when His Majesty appointed him governor of New Galicia. It was thought that his condition was
the result of his falling from his horse in New Mexico.!
. Licenciado Tejada looked into the cruelties and abuses
committed by Coronado and his captains during the expedition to the new land. He is found guilty and placed under
arrest in his home. Charges for these crimes are filed also
1. HFrancisco Vasquez se vi no a BU casa y esta mas para ser gobernado en ella
que para gobernar el ajena: f:iltanle muchos quilates y esta otro del que solia Ber
quando vuestra majestad ~e proveyo de aquella gobernaci6n; dicen 10 canso Ia caida
que dio de un caballo en Is pacificaci6n y descubrimiento de la tierr~ nueva."
In this quotation two corrections have been made from the facsimile of the
original, obtained in Sevilla last winter and now in the Coronado Library at Albuquerque.
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against Garcia Lopez de Cardenas, who is in Madrid at this
time. He had left Coronado in New Mexico because of an
injured arm, and also because his brother: had died in Spain
and he was called there to take charge of the estate. This
intrepid captain discovered the Grand Canyon during an
exploration trip accompanied by twelve men.
Another letter from' Licenciado Tejada to the emperor
is listed as document No. 244. In this letter, dated in Mexico
City on the last day of August, 1545, the Licenciado notifies
his monarch he has already forwarded to Spain the documents pertaining to Coronado's residencia. Among those
papers was a report (for which the king apparently had
asked) regarding the cruelties perpetrated by Coronado and
his captains during the expedition to "la tierra nueva."
This Epistolario is being published from copies of the
originals which were made by various transcribers for
Senor Paso y TroncoSo: For this reason the proof-readers,
however careful they may be, cannot correct the errors made
by the copyists. I have compared some. of the documents
with photostatic copies of the originals and found only small
errors that in no way impair the value of the edition. 2 I
will cite a few examples taken from Tejada's letter discussed
above. On page 183, line 5, where it readspor el sef el
pueblo, the first el is not in the original. The same is true
of the a on page 184, line 6; the la in la guerra on page 184,
line 15; the que on page 185, line·28. The sirvieron on page
185, line 29, should read sirviesen; the que on page 186, line
29, should be y. On page 187, line 26, de tributo shouid read
de pagar tributo. On "page 188, line 24, en should be' es, and
que, con que. The first y on page 189, line 1, is not in the
original; the second y on the same page, line 11, should be
que. The otros on page 189, line 22, should read los otros.
A marginal notation on the second paragraph of page 189,
reading veasse lo proveydo, has been omitted. On page 203
instrucci6n is misspelled twice.
2. The facsimiles of the two Tejada letters are from A. G. i., Mexico, 68. The
bulky reBidencia. record mentioned by Tejada is now in A. G. I., JUBticia., 389, and a
complete facsimile is in the Coronado Library.
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If the proofs could be corrected from photostatic copies
of the original documents most of these small errors could be
eliminated. But that would imply considerable cost and
delay. The originals are often difficult to read, and far from
exempt from errors, which the editors must explain in notes
or correct before publication. There are no explanatory
notes in the present edition- of the Epistolario. The copyists or the editors have corrected some of the obvious .mistakes found in the original Spanish texts.
As other volumes appear, containing documents bearing
directly on the history of New Mexico, we will bring them to
the attention of our readers.
.
AGAPITO REY

Indiana University
Home Missions on the American Frontier. With particular
reference to the American Home M1:ssionary Society.
By Colin Brummitt Goodykoontz. (The Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, 1939. 452 pp., bibliography,
index. $3.50.)
"The home missionary movement was the resultant
of many forces: Christian idealism, denominational rivalries, 'humanitarianism, nationalism, and enlightened selfinterest all had their effect in producing and directing a
movement designed to mold the West according to orthodox
Protestant standards." (p. 39). To this summary of motives
Professor Goodykoontz later adds (pp. 235 ff) the patriotic
motive of improving the quality of the electorate with the
coming of manhood suffrage in the nineteenth century.
"For the sake of clarity [about one-third of the book is
devoted to] the work of the Congregationalists and Presbyterians, especially their joint activities through the agency
of the American Home Missionary Society." (p. 7.) Other
churches discussed in less space are the Baptist, Church of
England, Lutheran, German Reformed, Dutch Reformed,
Methodist, and Roman Catholic, not to mention some minor
ones.
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The first chapter deals with motives for home missions.
Chapters II-IV cover the eighteenth century as a "background;" chapters V-XII deal with the nineteenth century;
and the final chapter interprets the significance of the home
missionary movement.
The book seems overweighted with detail, and yet it
"does not purport to be an Encyclopedia of Home Missions."
(p. 7.) Fortunately; some of the chapters end with a brief
summary; otherwise it would be difficult to see the forest for
the trees. A discussion of the several Wests is repetitious
due to their common characteristics of pioneer hardships
and rudeness. The paragraph construction is not always
good.
Numerous quotations from letters of missionaries
reveal their zeal and determination to missionize the West in
the face of dangers in travel and rough living accommoda- .
tions. They certainly afford evidence to substantiate the
traditional concept of rugged American individualism.
A twenty-two page bibliography and abundant footnotes show intensive use of source materials. The author
has done a very commendable piece of work and made a
worthy contribution to the literature on the history of the
West.
The Caxton Printers again display their good craftsmanship in binding and cover.
FRANK D. REEVE
University of New Mexico

"The Mallet expedition of 1739 through Nebraska, Kansas
and Colorado to Santa Fe." By Henri Folmer. A reprint of 13 pp. from The COlorado Magazine, xvi,
no. 5 (Sept. 1939).
Sometimes a short article is more of a contribution to
our history than many a thick book. Mr. Folmer is a graduate student at the University of Denver, and in his study
here listed he has used two documents which he translated
from the French text in Margry, Decouvertes et establisse-
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ments des Francais dans L'Amerique Septentrionale (Paris,
1888), vol. vi, 462 ff; 464 ff. Because of their interest in New
Mexico history, we take the liberty of quoting his transla.tion in full :
[Copy of a certificate given in Santa Fe to
seven Frenchmen by the general Jean Paez Hurtado, alcalde major and captain. of war in this
capitol city of Santa Fe and its jurisdiction, lieutenant-governor and captain_general of this kingdom of New Mexico and its provinces.]
I certify, as much as I am entitled to captain
don Louis de Sant Denis, who commands the fort
at the mouth of the Red River, and to all other
governors and captains, judges .and justices of the
Very Christian King of France and to all officers,
military or civilian, who might read this, that on
the 24th of July of last ·year, 1739, there came to
the city of Santa Fe eight Frenchmen, called Pierre
and Paul Mallet, brothers, Phillippe Robitaille,
Louis Morin, Michel Beslot, Joseph Bellecourt
and Manuel Gallien, creoles of Canada and New
France, and Jean David of Europe, who were received in my presence by Mr: Dominique de Mendoza, Lieutenant-Colonel, Governor and Lieutenant-General of this Kingdom. Said Governor asking them from where they came and what their object was, whereupon said Paul answered that they
came from N ~wFrance and that they had come
with the plan to introduce a trade with the Spaniards of this kingdom because of the close union
which exists between the two crowns of France and
Spain; that after having examined them, said Governor sent their rifles to the guards and tried to find
lodgings for them. Because there was no place in
the palace, I took them to my house, where I lodged
them all. A few days later I sent for their arms and
ammunition and a few objects belonging to them,
which they had saved while crossing a river, where
they lost nine horses, laden with merchandise and
their clothes. In spite of the fact that they were
almost naked, according to their report, they were
determined to discover this kingdom and establish
communication between New Mexico and the colonies of New Orleans and Canada and notwithstand-
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ing all sorts of difficulties and dangers on the part
of the wild tribes whom they met, they succeeded in
visiting the Spaniards, by whom they were well
received, being invited by them to eat in their
houses and being lodged, while waiting nine months
for the answer of the Archbishop, Viceroy of Mexico, dom Jean Antoine Bizaron. During this time
the Mallet brothers, who have stayed at my house
and shared my table, have led a regular and very
christian life and having plans to return, I advised them, that in case they should obtain a royal
cedula to trade with this kingdom, they bring on
their return a certificate and a pass from the Governor, because otherwise they will expose themselves to the confiscation of their goods, which they
should bring, and which will be considered contraband.
In behalf of which, etc. Made in Santa Fe, the
30th of April, 1740.
signed: JEAN P AEZ HURTADO
[Project of trade relations between Louisiana and
Santa Fe. Copy of a letter, addressed to Father
Beaubois by Father Sant lago de Rebald, vicar
and ecclesiastical judge in New Mexico.]
Upon this occasion, I write to you, Sir, concerning nine Frenchmen who came from New
France, called Pierre and Paul brothers, La Rose,
Phillippe, Bellecourt, Petit Jean, Galliere and
Moreau, who have told me of their plan to introduce a trade in these provinces, which at the present time does not possess any, but, if one would
allow them to execute their plan, one could easily
overcome this obstacle, because we are not farther
away than 200 leagues from a very rich mine,
abounding in silver, called Chiquagua, where the
inhabitants of this country often go to trade; and if
they saw a possibility of using what they could get
there, this would encourage them to exploit several
mines, which they have. As these Frenchmen spoke
about your Reverence, and of the good credit you
possess in the province and city of New Orleans, I
write to you in Spanish and not in Latin, in order
not to disturb you, and to inquire about the state of
your health, which I hope to be perfect and wish-
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ing you prosperity, offering you my service. I
occupy here the place of vicar and ecclesiastical
judge in this kingdom. My Reverend Father, these
Frenchmen made me understand that I could ask
you for the merchandise which I need in order to
provide for the needs of my family and that I could
obtain it easily through your good office, because of
the credit you possess among your people. I therefore profit without delay from this occasion to ask
you to procure me the amount of the list herewith
included and to send it to me, if possible, informing
me of the price in silver or reals, which I will pay as
an honest man and as soon as I can. In spite of the
fact that I live in a kingdom where money flows but
little, what I gain with my chaplainship is paid to
me in silver or reals, which I could save, but for
the future I have four thousand Piasters at Chiquagua, which I will have sent over after receiving
the answer of your Reverence, and we will know
whereupon we can count, on condition that I am
satisfied with the merchandise from your country;
but, according to what ,has been told me, I presume
that I shall be. Fearing to trouble you, I am the
servant of Your Reverence.

In these two documents and also in the abstract of the
report by Governor Bienville to Paris (for which see Mr.
Folmer's paper, pp. 4-10) there are many points of interest.
Hitherto we have had the understanding that these Frenchmen reached Santa Fe with sufficient tradegoods to keep
them busy for nine months; that they were unmolested by
the authorities, and returned to Louisiana with such profits
as to encourage other Franch ventures. But now we know
that, in fording the Kansas River, they lost practically everything but the clothes on their backs; yet they persisted in
reaching Santa Fe-not for any immediate trading but in
order to negotiate a trade arrangement with the Spanish
authorities. Such a proposal had to be referred to ,the viceroy in Mexico City, and their nine months stay in Santa Fe
is explained by the long distance to Mexico and the fact that
"only one convoy leaves [Santa Fe] every year to make this
journey." And Bienville's report continues:
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When the answer of the viceroy came, according to the report of these Canadians, they were
asked to stay in New Mexico. They thought that
the Spaniards intended to employ them to discover
a country towards the West, situated at a distance
of three months' traveling according to the tradition, true or false, of the Indians. It is said that its
inhabitants dress in silk and live in large cities on
the seacoast. Whatever the truth may be, the Canadians preferred to return and they were allowed to
leave with the letters of which a copy is herewith
included.
The above letters have suffered. somewhat from passing through a French translation, but we easily recognjze
ourold friend General Juan Paez Hurtado and the governor,
Don Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza (1739-1743) ; the "archbishop-viceroy" (1734~1740) was Juan Antonio de Vizarron
y Guiarreta. The fact that Hurtado addressed the. certificate rather particularly to Captain Louis de St. Denis sug':
gests that he may have inspired the trade proposal brought
to Santa Fe by the Mallet party; we know that, some twenty
years earlier, he was engaged in similar intrigue on the
Texas frontier.
Father "Sant Iago Rebald" can be no other than Fray
Santiago Roybal, who in 1730 had been appointed ecclesiastical judge by Bishop Crespo of Durango (Bancroft, New
Mexico and Arizona, 240) and who at this time was the only
vicar in New Mexico. He was still in active service as late as
1760 (N. M. HIST. REV., x, 185). Of course, he was unmarried, yet he wants French trade-goods for the needs of his
"family." In explaining this allusion, we find an interesting
side-light on contacts at Santa Fe with the French.
The vicar had a brother, Captain Ignacio Roybal whose
daughter Manuela (niece of the vicar) had been the second
wife of Captain Juan de Archibeque (Twitchell, Spanish
Archives, ii, 184-5). Jean L'Archeveque, Pierre Meusnier,
and Jacques Grollet were survivors of the ill-fated La Salle
expedition of 1685 who later found their way to New Mexico.
After Archibeque was killed in the Villazur disaster of 1720,
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his widow had remarried into the Sena family; but without
doubt she and her children, close relatives of the vicar,
account for his especial interest in these French visitors.
Those interested may find in Mr. Folmer's paper also
an annotated study of the route followed by the Mallet party.
L. B. B.

The Rebuilding of San Miguel at Santa Fe in 1710. By
George Kubler. (Contributions of the Taylor Museum,
Colorado Springs; 1939.)
This is a well printed and beautifully illustrated brochure of twenty-seven pages which, as stated in the opening
sentence, is based on a manuscript which now "forms part
of the Ritch Collection in the Huntington Library at Pasadena" (San Marino, California). However it may reflect
upon the Huntington Libra:r:y and those responsible for the
fact that this body of papers is at present in that library
rather than in the Spanish Archives at Santa Fe, this fact
does not in any way reflect upon the author of the brochure.
Incidentally, the endorsement "No. 277" which appears at
the beginning of the document is the file-number which was
put there by Don Donaciano Vigil when he was Territorial
secretary and in charge of the public archives in the Palace
of the Governors at Santa Fe. Similar numbers are to be
found on other papers of the so-called "Ritch Collection."
Dr. Kubler has done an excellent piece of work in his
annotated introduction, in reproducing the text of the original Spanish, and in his translation, of the document which
records the restoration work carried out in 1709-1710. We
shall look forward with interest to the larger work which·
he promises (note 18) on The Religious Architecture of New
Mexico.
L. B. B.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
T TIiE MEETING

of the Historical Society of New Mexico,

A held in the library of the Old Palace, November 21,

1939, the following officers were elected for the next biennium; president, Paul A. F. Walter; first vice-president, ExGovernor James F. Hinkle of Roswell; second viCe-president,
Ex-Governor Miguel A. Otero; corresponding secretary and
treasurer, Lansing B. Bloom of Albuquerque; assistant
treasurer and curator, Hester Jones. Twenty-one new members were elected to membership.
. The secretary reported many fine gifts and other accessions as well as improvements and installations, particularly
the reinstallation of the large Spanish reredos above a constructed altar with a railing carved and hand-painted in the
style of the Santuario at Chimayo. The rail painting was
done by Mrs. Gladys Temple.
The subject of state monuments and suitable marking
of historic sites was brought up and discussed. The State
Highway Department was praised for placing markers of
attractive design on or near such sites. Dr. Edgar L. Hewett,
Mrs. Gerald Cassidy.and Professor Bloom were appointed 'a
committee to recommend to the New Mexico Science Commission the creation of state monuments.
In the address· of the evening Professor Bloom spoke
informally on his recent archival work in Europe. He described highlights of his search for New Mexico historical.
sources during the past two years in archives and libraries of
Rome, Florence, Ravenna, Bologna, Venice and Paris;
and in Sevilla, Spain. He explained the reasons for the wide
scattering of New MexiCo historical material. In the days
of Spanish sovereignty over New Spain and especially over
what was then New Mexico, the civil and military authorities reported to Mexico City and after 1776 in part to Chihuahua; the judiCial authorities reported to the audiencia in
Guadalajara; the secular church officers to the bishop at
95
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Durango, and the Franciscans to their headquarters in
Mexico. From there reports were sent to the various central
authorities in Spain and in Rome. Mr. Bloom photographed
some 30,000 pages in the archives of Italy and Spain, finding
it quite possible to work in Sevilla during the Spanish civil
war. Many of the records secured are material relating to
Coronado, Cardenas and Vargas. He brought with him for
exhibit enlarged photographs of some of this material which
was scanned with much interest by those at the meeting.
Mr. Walter, presiding, announced that he had appointed
Mr. Bloom officially to attend the annual meeting of the
Mississippi Valley Historical Association in Omaha, May
4-6 next, where he has been invited to give a paper on early
Spanish exploration.
H.J.
PLAN FOR CORONADO MONUMENT

Architect's plans for the Coronado National Monument near 'Bernalillo have been approved by the New
Mexico Coronado Cuarto Centennial Commission, and work
on the construction is already under way, with a crew of
60 men on the job, Clinton P. Anderson, managing director
U. S. Coronado Exposition Commission, announced Tuesday.
"No effort is being spared to make the Coronado Monument one of the great scenic and archaeologic attractions of
the entire country," Mr. Anderson said. "Through the joint
cooperation of Works Progress Admiriistration, University
of New Mexico, Federal and State Coronado Commission,
and the Museum of New Mexico, more than $80,000 will be
spent on construction, landscaping, and preparation of
exhibits."
Plans of the architect, John Gaw Meem, Santa Fe, call
for a one-story pueblo style building with raised gallery.
Murals of Coronado's "Entrada," painted by the late Gerald
Cassidy, will take the principal position in the gallery.
A replica of the famous old Kuaua pueblo, diorama of
. the .Seven Cities of Cibola, and a relief map of New Mexico·
showing the Coronado trail and the mountain passes trav-
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ersed by the Conquistadores, will also be placed in the gallery section. In one corner a display case will contain Coronado's armour and typical costumes of the period. In the
opposite corner will be an exhibit of utensils and weapons of
the Coronado period, prepared by the School of American
Research under the direction of Dr. Edgar Lee Hewett,
director of the Museum of New Mexico and the School of
American Research. Dr. Hewett is in general charge of
plans and construction of the Monument.
Opposite the central gallery will be two wings, one containing offices and art exhibits, and the other devoted to
archaeological displays, including pottery and other material excavated from the Kuaua ruins.·
The 1200-room pueblo has been excavated and walls
have been raised in certain places to emphasize the vast
extent of the ancient capital of the Province of Tiguex..
The Monument site lies on the west side of the Rio
Grande, is visible from Highway 85. Plans for its development include landscaping down to the river bank, with a
botanical garden, and provision for adequate parking space.
-Albuquerque Morning Journal.
PURLOINED PAPERS-The Pacific Coast Branch of the
American Historical Association met in annual session
at Los Angeles during the holidays. At the brief business
session on December 29, the foll(nying resolution was
offered with the request that it be referred to the executive
council for consideration and action:
WHEREAS, in the field of historical research, we
sometimes encounter important source materials
which have been acquired improperly by their present holders.
BE IT RESOLVED that it be the recognized policy
of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association not to publish in our historical
quarterlies or otherwise recognize any paper, study,
graduate thesis or other production which in any
way rests upon the use of such allegedly wrongly
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acquired material unless it be accompanied by a
suitable printed recognition of this fact.

The motion was seconded, and without discussion the matter was referred as asked.
Immediately after adjournment we were interested in
being button-holed by Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, who was somewhat perturbed by the joshing of some of his friends: "What
have you been stealing now?" And he wanted to know what
was back of the motion. Our reply was: "Dr. Bolton, I can
illustrate out of your own experience. I understand that
some years· ago several entire legajos of documents which
had been purloined from the Archivo General in Mexico
City came into your possession at Berkeley . . ." That's a
lie," interrupted Dr. Bolton. "Wait a minute," we continued, ,"Let me finish.· I understand further that you saw to
it that those documents were returned to the· place where
they belonged." "Yes," nodded Dr. Bolto·n, "that is correct."
We then gave him, and later the secretary of the executive council, the salient facts as to a considerable body of
papers which originally were, without question, part of the
old public archives in Santa Fe but which, a few years ago,
were acquired by a library in another state.
Legal action can, of course, be resorted to for the re~
covery of public documents, but it would be much pleasanter
if any library or individual who acquires such papers would
emulate the example of Dr. Bolton and see that they are
promptly restored where they properly belong.. Probity
and a regard for ethical standards are to. be expected from
any person or institution engaged in historical research.
LANSING B. BLOOM.
GRAN QUIVIRA-How this name ever became attached to one· of the Saline pueblos has been a puzzle; we
have never been able to trace back such use of the name
earlier· than by Gregg in his Commerce of the Prairies
(1844). But recently in reading proof on a transcription
from the journals of A. F. A. Bandelier, we came across the
following entry under date of 5 November 1883:
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The town of EI Paso del Norte is a big Indian
village, below trees, except the two principal Streets,
where the houses are connected. The Indians
mostly live in the "Bancal" [ ?]. At 2 p. m. I could
at last see the Cura Ramon Ortiz. He told me . . .
Foundation of the church, 1656, Fray Martin de
Hinajosa. Origin of the name Gran-Quivira being
applied to the present Pueblo [Tabid,]. An ancestor of his, a Spanish officer, came hither at the beginning of this century, sent by the Spanish government after the Gran Quivira. He looked for it
in the N. W. and surveyed the Pueblo Bonito &c.
&c. But an old "Jumano" Indian, "Tio Juan Largo"
of Socorro, called attention to the present Pueblo
of Quivira, and thus the name remained.
On the other hand, as late as April 2, 1778, Fray Escalante
in writing to Fray Juan Agustin Morfi expressed the opinion that
the Gran Quivira, according to the region in which
they have always considered it to be, and according
to what I have been able to find out until now, with
all the narratives about it that I have seen or heard,
is nothing else than the villages of the Panana
(Pawnee) Indians . . .
(Twitchell, Sp. Archs., ii, 279)
The two citations would seem to limit the time of transition
within thirty years or possibly less, so that the explanation
found by Bandelier is very credible.
L. B. B.
CUMULATIVE INDEX-With this issue the NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW begins its fifteenth volume. Next fall
the editors plan to publish a cumulative index of the entire
series which will be supplied without additional' charge to
current subscribers, and to others of record who maintained
their subscription for five years or more.
Libraries in this country and abroad, and individuals
who make frequent use of their back files will welcome the
aid of such a ready-reference volume. Instead of having to
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consult fifteen separate indices, the inquirer can then see at
a glance what may be available on a particular topic. It is
thought also that a fifteen-year tabulation of contents and
contributors will be both helpful and impressive.
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CONSTITUTION
OF THE

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
(As amended Nov. 19, 1929)
Article 1. Name. This Society shall be called the Historical Society
of New Mexico.
Article 2. Objects and Operation. The objects of the Society shall be,
in general, the promotion of historical studies; and in particular, the
discovery, collection, preservation, and publication of historical material, especially such as relates to New Mexico.
Article 3. Membership. The Society shall consist of Members, Fellows, Life Members and Honorary Life Members.
(a) Members. Persons recommended. by the Executive Council
and elected by the Society may become members.
(b) Fellows. Members who show, by published work, special
aptitude· for historical ,investigation may become Fellows. Immediately following the adoption of this Constitution, the Executive
Council shall elect five Fellow,s, and the body thus created may thereafter elect additional Fellows on the nomination of the Executive
Council. The number of Fellows shall never exceed twenty-five.
(c) Life Members. In addition to life members of the Historical
Society of New Mexico at.the date~of the adoption hereof, such other
benefactors of the Society as shall pay into its treasury at one time
the sum of fifty dollars, or shall present to the Society an equivalent
in books, manuscripts, portraits, or other acceptable material of an
historic nature, may upon recommendation by the Executive Council
and election by the Society, be classed as Life Members.
(d) Honorary Life Members. Persons who have rendered eminent service to New Mexico and others who have, by published work,
contributed to the historical literature of New Mexico or the Southwest, may become Honorary Life Members upon being recommended
by the Executive Council and elected by the Society.
Article 4. Officers. The elective officers of the Society shall be a
president, two vice-presidents, a corresponding secretary and treasurer, and a recording secretary; and these five officers shall constitute
the Executive Council with full administrative powers.
Officers shall qualify on January 1st following their election, and
shall, hold office for the term of two years and until their successors

Artice5. Elections. At the October meeting of each odd-numbered
'year, a nominating committee shall be named by the president of the
Society and such committee shall make its report to the Society at
the November meeting. Nominations may be made from the floor
and the Society shall, in open meeting, proceed to elect its officers by
ballot, those nominees receiving a majority of the votes cast for the
respective offices to be declared elected.
Article 6. Dues. Dues shall be $3.00 for each calendar year, and
shall entitle members to receive' bulletins as published and also the
Historical Review.
Article 7. Publications. All publications of the Society and the selection and editing of matter for publication shall be under the. direction
and control of the Executive Council.
Article 8. Meetings. Monthly meetings of the Society shall be held at
the rooms of the Society on the third Tuesday of each month at
eight P. M. The Executive Council shall meet at any time upon call
of the President or of three of its members.
Article 9. Quorums. Seven members of the Society and three members of the Executive Council, shall constitute quorums.
Article 10. Amendments. Amendments to this constitution shall bp.come operative after being recommended by the Executive Council
and approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting at
any regular monthly meeting; provided, that notice of the proposed
amendment shall have been given at a regular meeting of the Society,
at least four weeks prior to the meeting when such proposed amendment is passed upon by the Society.

Students and friends of Southwestern History are cordially invited to become members. Applications should be addressed to the
corresponding secretary, Lansing B. Bloom, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.

